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V 
4.0 Executive summary 
 
Prior to answering our first general question, we performed analyses for empirical evidence 
on the cross-national comparability of (sets of) items. We decided that only those (sets of) 
items that can be shown to be comparable across nations can be used to answer our first 
general question, i.e. on the prevalence of different exclusionist stances supported by the 
populations of several Eastern and Western European societies.  
 
• We discovered resistance to immigrants that prevails among approximately half 
of the general public.  
• We distinguished resistance to asylum seekers that is somewhat less widespread, 
supported by approximately one out of three people.  
• We found resistance to diversity was shared by nearly half of the people living 
in these European societies.  
• A minority of one out of five people indicated that they wish to avoid social 
interaction with migrants and minorities living in their country, i.e. admitted to 
their desire to keep them at (ethnic) distance.  
• We found a vast majority of approximately two out of three people to be in 
favour of repatriation policies for migrants who had committed (serious) crimes.  
 
Many of these exclusionist stances are determined by the perception of collective ethnic 
threat that appeared to be prevalent among somewhat less than two out of three people. 
 
We found large differences between the countries that we took into account. Many of these 
exclusionist stances turn out to be widely supported by people living in Mediterranean 
countries among which Greece often comes out on top, just as we found in previous 
reports. Many of these exclusionist stances are also rather strongly supported by people 
living in Eastern European societies. People living in Nordic countries appear to 
disassociate themselves from these exclusionist stances more often, whereas people living 
in Western European countries often take a position in between. 
 
Next, let us turn to our second general question, i.e. on differences between social 
categories regarding these different exclusionist stances. We would like to emphasise that 
we found very consistent differences across the distinguished dimensions of exclusionism.  
 
• We generally found that the higher the educational level that people have 
reached, the less they support exclusionist stances. The lower people’s 
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educational attainment, the more they support exclusionist stances holds for 
most stances except for resistance to asylum seekers in which case we found that 
differences between educational categories were quite minor.  
• In terms of occupational categories, we found that self-employed people and 
people performing manual labour support most if not all exclusionist stances 
considered in this report, followed by people who depend on social security and 
people running the household.  
• People in the lowest income quartile also quite generally support exclusionist 
stances. Older age categories, those over 50, turn out to support most 
exclusionist stances. This does not hold for resistance to asylum seekers which is 
supported somewhat more by younger age categories.  
• Most dimensions of exclusionism were supported somewhat more by people 
living in rural villages or in the countryside.  
• With regard to religious attendance, we found that generally people who 
frequently attend religious services support many instances of exclusionism, 
more than people who never attend, except for the resistance to asylum seekers 
in which case the pattern is the other way around: people who never attend show 
more resistance than people who attend religious services frequently.  
• People on the right wing of the political spectrum support different stances of 
exclusionism quite consistently, also when it comes to asylum seekers.  
 
 Considering our third general question, the answer can be relatively short:  
 
• We discovered no spurious determinants at the individual level regarding the 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.  
 
Actually, most of the determinants turned out to be rather consistently related to these 
dimensions, as described in the previous paragraph. The one exception is religious 
attendance that turned out to be somewhat inconsistently related to the various 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Yet, we found that the more frequently people 
attend religious services, the more they resist diversity and the more they favour ethnic 
distance. Remarkably, we found that gender differences reached significance: some 
instances of exclusionism turned out to be somewhat more supported by men than by 
women. 
 
Regarding our fourth general question, on the contribution of national conditions to the 
explanation of ethnic exclusionism, we found that:  
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• The level of the GDP has consistently negative effects that often reach 
significance: the higher the GDP, the lower ethnic exclusionism.  
• The effects of the presence of non-western non-nationals and net migration are 
often positive yet do not reach significance for most instances of exclusionism.  
 
The exception is that the higher the proportion of non-western non-nationals in the country 
or the higher the net migration has been in preceding years, the more people in the country 
are resistant to diversity. Moreover, net migration also turned out to affect support for 
repatriation policies. We ascertained some odd effects of the level of unemployment that, 
however, only rarely reached significance. Effects of the number of asylum applicants 
turned out to be inconsistent and non-significant. As yet, most of the significant effects of 
country characteristics appeared to be consistent with our expectations.  
 
Additionally, we would like to emphasise that we found very consistent effects of 
individual perceptions: the more people perceive decreases in their personal safety or the 
more they distrust other people or distrust political leaders, or the more they consider 
themselves to be politically right wing, or the more they perceive ethnic minorities to pose 
a collective threat, the more they favour ethnic exclusionism. These individual perceptions 
were actually ascertained to explain, at least partially, the relationships between individual 
and contextual conditions and exclusionist stances. 

  
4 Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in Eastern  
and Western European Societies 
 
Just as in previous reports, we started from our conceptual analysis of different stances 
related to ethnic exclusionism, i.e. different social phenomena indicating that the majority 
of the country wishes or tries to exclude minorities. We tested a wide range of exclusionist 
stances for purposes of cross-national comparisons, in those countries for which data are 
actually available: only those stances for which we found empirical evidence that they were 
cross-nationally comparable were to be included in the report. Therefore, we once again 
decided that items that appeared not to be associated with other items related to a certain 
aspect of ethnic exclusionism or items that turned out to not be valid for a particular set of 
countries therefore had to be excluded from the report (see the technical details in 
Appendix 3). Eventually, we ended up with a set of six stances related to ethnic 
exclusionism, including a total number of 20 items. We used these cross-nationally 
comparable items to calculate index scores for Europeans living on European soil. Next to 
the grand means of these scores, we present percentages of Europeans living on European 
soil who support particular exclusionist stances. Appendix 6 contains more detailed 
information on the calculation procedures. Let us start with the differences between the 
aspects of ethnic exclusionism distinguished. 
 
Six ‘dimensions’ of ethnic exclusionism 
Overview 1: grand means and percentages supporting different dimensions of the 
majority population’s attitudes 
 mean % support 
Resistance to immigrants .50 50 
Resistance to asylum seekers .44 29 
Resistance to diversity .56 48 
Favour ethnic distance .30 21 
Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants .70 70 
Perceived collective ethnic threat .56 58 
 
Quite widespread support exists among people living in Eastern and Western societies, 
amounting to 70% (grand mean=.70) for repatriation policies, support for this stance is 
therefore actually far more widespread than we ascertained in previous reports. This major 
difference is due to the ‘subjects’ of repatriation. In previous measurements included in 
Eurobarometers, items on the repatriation of legal migrants in any event or in the event 
they became unemployed, were submitted to the public whereas in European Social Survey 
2 REPORT 4 
 
2 
the items refer to migrants who have committed (serious) crimes. Next, we ascertained that 
nearly half of the samples (48%, grand mean=.56) appear to show their resistance to 
diversity. Similarly, we found that a majority of the Europeans (amounting to 58%, grand 
mean=.56) perceive minorities as a collective threat. Resistance to immigrants (grand 
mean=.50) turns out to be more widespread than resistance to asylum seekers (grand 
mean=.44). A minority (of 21%, grand mean=.30) is in favour of ethnic distance which 
implies that they wish to avoid social contacts with migrants. 
 
4.1 Comparisons between societies: descriptive 
analyses 
 
Let us start with our first question, introduced in Report 1.  
 
4) To what extent does the general public in different countries vary in its support 
for different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? 
 
To calculate these differences, we have executed analyses of variance which provide us 
with the means of the various countries as well as with tests of significance. In Appendix 6 
we list the means per country as well as the percentages of people who support these 
exclusionist stances. Generally, the differences we set out to describe are significant which 
is, given the number of respondents, to be expected. We present the findings in graphs 
which are easy to read and allow you to ascertain differences visually.  
 
4.1.1 Resistance to immigrants 
 
We will start out with cross-national differences on the resistance to immigrants. The items 
refer to resistance to the influx and admittance of immigrants belonging to a different race 
or ethnic group than the majority population. Moreover, the items also refer to immigrants 
coming from poor countries from outside Europe and coming from poor countries within 
Europe. Should immigration policies for these migrants be generous or rather restrictive, is 
the question that has been posed to numerous Europeans. Let us take a look at the 
differences between Europeans. Approximately 50% of the public shows resistance to these 
immigrants. 
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Figure 1: mean country scores on resistance to immigrants 
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We find a number of countries in which the resistance to immigrants is far more 
widespread than in general in these Western and Eastern societies: in Greece and Hungary, 
the public support this view quite strongly which also holds true but to a somewhat lesser 
extent for Portugal. In some countries, this type of resistance is somewhat above the grand 
mean of all the countries together: in Finland, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Austria. 
Other countries are (well) below the grand mean: like some of the Nordic countries 
(Sweden), some of Western European countries, (Ireland, and former West Germany), 
some of the Mediterranean countries (Spain and Italy) as well as one country in Eastern 
Europe (Poland). 
 
4.1.2 Resistance to asylum seekers 
 
The second aspect we distinguished refers to resistance to asylum seekers. These items all 
refer to the treatment of asylum seekers that have already entered the country. Should they 
be given or denied permission to work during the time of the procedure to get legally 
admitted to the country? Should they be given or denied financial support during this 
procedure and should they be given the right to reunite with their family once they are 
legally admitted to the country? Let us take a look at the cross-national differences. 
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Figure 2: mean country scores on resistance to asylum seekers 
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We find that in a number of countries resistance to asylum seekers is widespread. This is 
the case in some Western European countries (such as Great Britain, Belgium and the 
Netherlands), but also in some Eastern European countries (such as former East-Germany, 
Hungary and Slovenia). Around the general level of resistance we find countries such as 
Ireland, former West Germany, some of the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy and 
Greece) and the Czech Republic. Support for the strict treatment of asylum seekers is far 
less widespread in the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark), but also in 
Luxembourg, Spain and Poland. 
 
4.1.3 Resistance to diversity 
 
The previous aspects of ethnic exclusionism were quite different from the dimensions 
present in the Eurobarometers. However, resistance to diversity has some similarities to the 
measurements on the ‘resistance to multicultural society’ in the Eurobarometers. The 
measurement in European Social Survey as such, however, differs. Here, resistance to 
diversity comes to the fore in statements on the explicit preference for a monocultural 
society in which the majority of people share the same customs and traditions and, 
moreover, in the rejection of a multi-denominational society where everyone can live 
according to his/her own religious views. This type of resistance is supported by nearly half 
the general public. Let us take a look at the cross-national differences. As explained in 
Technical Appendix 3, the mean score in Luxembourg on resistance to diversity is not 
comparable to the mean scores of other countries. 
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Figure 3: mean country scores on resistance to diversity 
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Widespread resistance to diversity is prevalent in some of the Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal and Greece) but also in some Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia). Vice versa, it is less widespread in Nordic countries (Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark) and in many Western European countries (Great Britain, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria). 
 
4.1.4 Favour ethnic distance 
 
Next, we turn to the avoidance of social interaction with immigrants in society. In Report 1 
we briefly described a long and extended tradition of measuring the avoidance of social 
interaction with migrants in different domains, both public and private. To what extent do 
Europeans wish to avoid social interaction with migrants belonging to the same or different 
ethnic groups, who are their superiors at work or with migrants who become members of 
the family? Approximately 21% of the general public wish to avoid such social interaction. 
Let us take a look at the cross-national differences. 
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Figure 4: mean country scores on ethnic distance 
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Among the countries in which the public favours ethnic distance more than in general, we 
find some of the Mediterranean countries (Italy and Greece) but also some of the Eastern 
European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovenia and to a lesser extent Hungary). Vice 
versa, ethnic distance is somewhat less widespread in some of the Nordic countries 
(Sweden and Denmark) but also in some of the Western European countries (Luxembourg, 
Austria and former West-Germany) and in some other Mediterranean countries (Spain and 
Portugal). 
  
4.1.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants 
 
In previous reports, we described support for repatriation policies which wish to repatriate 
all migrants or migrants who become unemployed. Here, in the European Social Survey, 
support for repatriation refers to repatriation in case of any (serious) crime. Generally, a 
vast majority of approximately 70% of the public is in favour of repatriation of criminal 
migrants. To what extent do Europeans differ in the extent to which they feel that such 
immigrants should be made to leave the country? 
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Figure 5: mean country scores on being in favour of repatriation policies for criminals 
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We once again find that support for repatriation policies for criminal migrants is relatively 
widespread in most of the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, but particularly in 
Greece) as well as in Eastern European countries (former East Germany, Poland, but 
particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary). In most of the Nordic and West European 
countries, the support for such repatriation policies for criminal migrants is (far) less 
widespread.  
 
4.1.6 Perceived collective ethnic threat 
 
Now, let us turn to the perception of collective ethnic threat that we proposed in Report 1 
as an explanatory determinant of many exclusionist stances, building on Ethnic 
Competition Theory. The items present in European Social Survey refer to economic 
threats as well as cultural threats posed by the presence of immigrants that are perceived by 
approximately 58% of the general public. Let us have a look at the extent to which the 
Europeans perceive immigrants to pose a collective threat to the situation in the country. 
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Figure 6: mean country scores on perceived collective ethnic threat 
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Particularly in Greece a majority perceives migrants as a threat to society, followed by 
some of the Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary, and somewhat 
less in former East Germany and Slovenia). This perceived threat is somewhat less 
prevalent in Western European countries (Luxembourg) and in the Nordic countries. 
 
4.2 Comparisons between social categories:  
descriptive analyses 
 
Next, we set out to answer our second general question:  
 
4) Which social characteristics among the general public support different 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism? 
 
In order to answer this question, we performed analyses of variance for the differences 
between social categories. The relationships between social characteristics and dimensions 
of exclusionism we report have proven to reach significance levels. 
 
4.2.1 Resistance to immigrants 
 
Let us first turn to the resistance to immigrants in society. For reasons of consistency, we 
will start with differences between educational categories. 
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Figure 7: resistance to immigrants by education 
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We find a pattern similar to the ones we already ascertained in previous reports: the higher 
someone’s education, the lower their resistance to immigrants. Categories of people who 
have not completed primary education or who have the first stage of basic education or 
who have finished their education at a lower secondary level or in the second stage of basic 
education generally show more resistance than the people who prolonged their educational 
career. 
Next, let us take a look at the differences between occupational categories. We find that 
self-employed people, skilled and unskilled manual workers, but also people who have 
retired or are disabled, and those who work in the household appear to have a somewhat 
more than average resistance to immigrants. We would like to emphasise that this pattern is 
quite similar to the pattern we found in the EU member states (Report 2). 
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Figure 8: resistance to immigrants by occupation 
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Figure 9: resistance to immigrants by income 
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When we turn to the differences between household income categories, we also recognise 
patterns that we have ascertained in previous reports. Particularly people in the lowest 
income quartile stand out in terms of resistance to immigrants.  
 
Figure 10: resistance to immigrants by age  
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Let us turn to the differences between age categories. Here, we also find a pattern 
somewhat similar to the ones we have previously discovered: the older people are, the 
more resistance they show. Particularly, people in their sixties and seventies show more 
resistance to migrants.  
 
Figure 11: resistance to immigrants by urbanisation 
GRAND MEAN
.50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
big city suburbs or
outskirts of
big city
town or small
city
country
village
farm or home
in countryside 
 
12 REPORT 4 
 
12 
Regarding urbanisation, we only find minor differences. It turns out that there is somewhat 
less resistance to immigrants in the suburbs or on the outskirts of big cities and somewhat 
more in country villages. 
 
Figure 12: resistance to immigrants by religious attendance 
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There are modest differences in stance between people regarding the extent to which they 
attend religious services. People who attend frequently or at least once a month show 
somewhat more resistance than people who never attend. 
 
Figure 13: resistance to immigrants by political orientation 
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Political orientation also appears to be related to resistance to immigrants. The pattern is 
that the more right wing people are, the more they resist immigrants. 
 
4.2.2 Resistance to asylum seekers 
 
Next, let us examine the differences for resistance to asylum seekers, beginning with the 
differences between educational categories. We would like to emphasise that the 
differences between social categories for this particular exclusionist stance are much more 
modest than for other exclusionist stances. Let us consider these, rather minor, differences. 
 
Figure 14: resistance to asylum seekers by education 
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Usually, we find rather big differences between educational categories. Instead, we found 
minor differences. Particularly, the lower educated do not differ much from the grand mean 
that we have ascertained in these countries. The mean scores of the higher educated people 
show the pattern that we have found in previous analyses: they show less resistance to 
asylum seekers, but not that much less than the general public. Both observations mean that 
the measure of association between educational attainment and resistance to asylum 
seekers is half as high (eta=.12) than the association between education and other 
exclusionist stances (eta’s ranging in between .20 and .26). 
 
In terms of occupation we also find quite modest differences. Yet, we found that the 
occupational categories that generally support exclusionist stances more than average, once 
again came to the fore: particularly the (skilled and unskilled) manual workers and the 
unemployed resist to asylum seekers. 
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Figure 15: resistance to asylum seekers by occupation 
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Figure 16: resistance to asylum seekers by income 
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Regarding income categories we also find very modest differences, yet a similar pattern: 
people in the lowest income quartile support resistance to asylum seekers somewhat more 
than people in other income categories. 
 
Next, let us consider the differences between age categories. Again, we find minor 
differences (the association measure is .03) whereas in other cases of exclusionism, we find 
bigger differences between these age categories (ranging between .09 and .16). 
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Figure 17: resistance to asylum seekers by age 
GRAND MEAN
(.44)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
 
Younger age categories, that is people under the age of 40, turn out to show a bit more 
resistance to asylum seekers than people in their forties and fifties, although we have to 
emphasise that these differences are only minor. 
 
We have to make similar remarks about the (minor) differences regarding urbanisation. 
People living in small cities and country villages have somewhat more resistance to asylum 
seekers whereas people living in other areas show somewhat less resistance to asylum 
seekers. 
 
Figure 18: resistance to asylum seekers by urbanisation 
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Let us now turn to the differences between people regarding the extent to which they attend 
religious services. Here we find that people who never attend religious services show 
somewhat more resistance, whereas people who attend regularly show somewhat less 
resistance. Remarkably, this pattern is the opposite of the pattern we ascertained regarding 
resistance to immigrants. 
 
Figure 19: resistance to asylum seekers by religious attendance 
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Figure 20: resistance to asylum seekers by political orientation 
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Also, in terms of political orientation we find that the differences between categories are 
quite modest. We find that those who consider themselves to be in the centre or on the right 
wing of the political spectrum show somewhat more resistance to asylum seekers whereas 
those on the left of the political spectrum tend to disassociate themselves somewhat from 
this point of view. 
 
4.2.3 Resistance to diversity 
 
Let us turn to resistance to diversity, the phenomenon that indicates that people prefer to 
have a monocultural society and reject a society in which there are many different habits, 
traditions and denominations.  
We will start with differences between educational categories. Here, we ascertain a pattern 
that we have found before: the higher someone’s level of education, the lower their 
resistance to diversity. People who have attained the level of upper secondary education or 
a higher level show less resistance to diversity than those who have finished their 
educational career at a lower level. 
 
Figure 21: resistance to diversity by education 
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When we take a look at the differences between occupational categories, we (again) find 
that self-employed people, people performing manual labour, those who depend on social 
security and people working in the household resist diversity more strongly than people 
working in more privileged occupations. 
 
Figure 22: resistance to diversity by occupation 
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Differences between income categories are far more modest, but the pattern is similar to 
those ascertained previously: people in the lowest quartile show more resistance than 
people in the highest quartile. 
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Figure 23: resistance to diversity by income 
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Let us turn to the differences between age categories. There are only minor differences 
between people under the age of fifty: they all show somewhat less resistance to diversity 
than people in their sixties and seventies. 
 
Figure 24: resistance to diversity by age 
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When we turn to residential categories, we again find minor differences. People living in 
country villages turn out to resist a bit more to diversity in society than the general public. 
 
Figure 25: resistance to diversity by urbanisation 
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Next, we consider the differences between categories of people who differ in their religious 
attendance. We find that the people who attend frequently or monthly show more resistance 
to diversity than people who rarely or never attend. 
 
Figure 26: resistance to diversity by religious attendance 
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Figure 27: resistance to diversity by political orientation 
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Again, we find that those who consider themselves to be on the right wing of the political 
spectrum show more resistance to diversity than those on the left wing. 
 
4.2.4 Favour ethnic distance 
 
Next, we turn to ethnic distance, i.e. the wish to avoid social interaction with migrants in 
different public and private domains. Regarding educational attainment, we ascertain a 
pattern that we have found in many previous analyses: the higher someone’s educational 
level, the less they favour ethnic distance to migrants. Actually, among people who have 
not completed primary education ethnic distance is twice as high (mean=.4) as among 
people who have finished the second stage of tertiary education (mean=.2). 
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Figure 28: favour ethnic distance by education 
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In terms of occupational categories, we (again) find a similar pattern: the self-employed 
and those who depend on social security favour ethnic distance somewhat more, followed 
by (skilled and unskilled) manual labourers and people working in the household. 
 
Figure 29: favour ethnic distance by occupation 
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Figure 30: favour ethnic distance by income 
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We find that people in the lowest income quartile support this particular exclusionist stance 
somewhat more than people in the highest income quartile. 
Next, we turn to differences between age categories. We once again ascertained a pattern 
similar to those previously described: the older people are, the more they favour ethnic 
distance. Age 50 and up, people tend to favour ethnic distance more than the general 
public. 
 
Figure 31: favour ethnic distance by age 
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When we turn to urbanisation, we find that people living in country villages or in the 
countryside favour ethnic distance more than people living in (the suburbs of)  big cities. 
 
Figure 32: favour ethnic distance by urbanisation 
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Next we looked at people and their attendance at religious services. We again found that 
people who attend frequently or monthly, favour ethnic distance more than those who 
never attend religious services. 
 
Figure 33: favour ethnic distance by religious attendance 
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In terms of political orientation, we found a similar pattern to the ones described above: the 
more right wing people favour ethnic distance more than those on the left wing, whereas 
the people who consider themselves politically in the centre exactly in the middle, i.e. on 
the European average. 
 
Figure 34: favour ethnic distance by political orientation 
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4.2.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants 
 
Now, let us turn to repatriation policies for immigrants who have committed serious 
criminal offences. We have already ascertained that a majority of the general public wishes 
these migrants to leave the country. 
Differences between educational categories are, again, rather consistent. The higher 
someone’s educational level, the less they favour repatriation policies. People who have 
finished upper secondary level education are exactly in between: people with lower 
educational attainments support this type of repatriation policy more, whereas people with 
higher attainments support this policy less. 
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Figure 35: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by education 
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Strikingly consistent are the findings in terms of differences between occupational 
categories: the self-employed stand out to favour this type of repatriation policy together 
with the people who depend on social security, followed by manual labourers and people 
working in the household. 
 
Figure 36: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by occupation 
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In terms of income differences, another strikingly consistent pattern emerges: people in the 
lowest income quartile favour repatriation more than those with higher incomes. 
 
Figure 37: favour repatriation policies for criminal immigrants by income 
GRAND MEAN
.70
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
lowest next to lowest next to highest highest
 
Next, we turn to differences between age categories. Again we found, a similar pattern with 
the people in their fifties exactly in between the other age categories: the younger ones 
favour this type of policy less, whereas the older ones favour this policy more. 
 
Figure 38: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by age 
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Then, we turn to differences between categories of urbanisation, which are quite minor. We 
find somewhat less support for this type of policy among the people living in the suburbs 
and those living in the countryside and somewhat more support among those living in the 
country villages. 
 
Figure 39: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by urbanisation 
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Next, we turn to (minor) differences between people who go to religious services. We 
found that people who attend frequently or monthly favour repatriation policies for these 
(criminal) migrants more than those who never attend. 
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Figure 40: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by religious attendance 
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In terms of political orientation, we find the similar pattern: those on the far right support 
these repatriation policies more than those on the left wing. Moreover, a pattern that was 
already visible in previous diagrams is now more distinct: people on the far left do not 
differ from people in the middle of the political spectrum. 
 
Figure 41: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by political orientation 
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4.2.6 Perceived collective ethnic threat 
 
Next, let us consider the perception of collective ethnic threat, i.e. the view that migrants 
and minorities pose an economic and cultural threat to the majority that we have proposed 
to be to some extent responsible for many exclusionist stances. 
Again, we find the pattern that we ascertained previously in a number of instances: the 
lower someone’s educational attainment, the stronger they perceive migrants as a collective 
threat, with the people who finished upper secondary level education exactly in the middle. 
 
Figure 42: perceived collective ethnic threat by education 
GRAND MEAN
(.55)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
The same occupational categories that we mentioned regarding previous exclusionist 
stances stand out when it comes to the perception of collective ethnic threat which also 
holds true for the income categories. 
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Figure 43: perceived collective ethnic threat by occupation 
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Figure 44: perceived collective ethnic threat by income 
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When we turn to the differences between age categories, we again find a similar pattern to 
that found before with the people in their fifties exactly in the middle: those who have not 
yet reached this age (category) turn out to perceive migrants somewhat less as a collective 
threat whereas those who have passed this age (category) perceive migrants as more of a 
collective threat. 
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Figure 45: perceived collective ethnic threat by age 
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Next, we turn to the minor differences between people living in cities and small villages. 
We find that the people living in country villages perceive migrants more as a collective 
threat than other people. 
 
Figure 46: perceived collective ethnic threat by urbanisation 
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We find that people who attend religious services frequently experience (slightly) more of 
a collective threat from the presence of migrants than those who never attend religious 
services. 
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Figure 47: perceived collective ethnic threat by religious attendance 
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Figure 48: perceived collective ethnic threat by political orientation 
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People on the right wing of the political spectrum perceive more of a collective ethnic 
threat than people on the left. Again we find that the people on the far left do not differ so 
much from the people in the middle of the political spectrum. 
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4.3 Comparisons between states and social categories: 
multivariate multi-level analyses 
 
The following paragraphs of this report will be devoted to answering our third and fourth 
general questions:  
 
4) Which social characteristics are spuriously related to (different dimensions of) 
ethnic exclusionism? 
4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect (dimensions of) ethnic 
exclusionism? 
 
For this purpose, we performed multivariate multi-level analyses on each of the dimensions 
of ethnic exclusionism, just like in previous reports.  
 
There is, however, a major difference with the previous reports: that is the inclusion of so-
called intermediate characteristics on individual perceptions (see Table 1b which lists 
intermediate characteristics such as ‘social distrust’ and ‘political distrust’).  
 
These perceptions are theoretically considered, building on Ethnic Competition Theory, to 
provide interpretations or explanations for the relationships between individual conditions 
(like educational attainment and occupation), on the one hand, and the dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism, on the other. These intermediate characteristics will be added to the models 
to explain ethnic exclusionism, after the individual and national conditions have been taken 
into account to explain their relationship with the various dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism. We follow the same procedure as elaborated somewhat more extensively in 
Report 2. 
 
4.3.1 Resistance to immigrants 
 
This attitude turned out to be held by approximately half the general public. Comparing 
Model 1 to Model 0 in Table 1a tells us that there are strong and significant differences 
between the countries under consideration. A comparison of Model 2 to Model 1 in Table 
1a shows that there are also significant differences between social categories. However, 
adding Model 3 country characteristics to the characteristics included in Model 2 does not 
significantly improve the fit of the model. Yet taking into account the intermediate 
characteristics does improve the fit of the model, even more strongly than previous 
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determinants related to individual and national conditions did, as shown by the decrease in 
the log-likelihood of the model. 
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Table 1a. Different multi-level models on resistance to immigrants (*=significant 
improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 153.403   
1 + random variation at country level 149.102 4.301* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 142.910 6.192* 21 
3 +country characteristics 142.904 6 5 
4 +intermediate characteristics 131.041 11.863* 5 
 
The parameters of Model 2 in Table 1b show that the effect of educational attainment 
reaches significance: the higher someone’s level of education, the less they resist  
immigrants. Differences between occupational categories when compared to the reference 
category, i.e. higher professionals, also reach significance. We find that people performing 
manual work, those dependent on social security or those running a household and the self-
employed resist immigrants more strongly than higher professionals do. Worth mentioning 
is the finding that routine non-manuals also differ significantly from the latter category. 
The effect of income is negative: the lower someone’s household income, the more they 
resist immigrants. In terms of urbanisation, we find that people living in more urbanised 
parts of the country resist immigrants less strongly than people living in the countryside. 
Resistance to immigrants prevails more strongly among the elderly. We find no significant 
differences between categories of religious service attendance and gender. 
 
Regarding the effects of country characteristics, presented in Model 3, we find that the 
effect of the GDP reaches significance: the higher the country’s GDP, the lower the 
resistance to immigrants. The effect of unemployment is significant too, but in a direction 
which is at odds with our hypotheses: the higher the country’s unemployment level, the 
lower the resistance to immigrants. The other country characteristics do not reach 
significance. We would like to mention though, that the effects of the presence of non-
national non-westerners as well as the effect of net migration are in the direction that we 
proposed whereas the effect of asylum applications is in the opposite direction to that 
described in our hypotheses. 
 
Inclusion of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4 does contribute quite strongly to 
the explained variance at individual as well as at contextual level. We find that all of the 
intermediate determinants contribute to resistance to immigrants: the more someone’s 
political orientation is on the right wing of the political spectrum, the more they perceive 
that they are unsafe, the more they distrust other people, the more they distrust political 
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leaders and the more they perceive allochthonous people to be a collective threat and the 
more they show resistance to immigrants.  
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Table1b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to immigrants 
standard errors in brackets (N=30915) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.50 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 
Individual characteristics     
Education (in years)  -1.11-2 (0.00) -1.11-2 (0.00) -0.46-2 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)     
Lower professionals  -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Routine non-manuals  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Students  -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Retired people  0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 
Housewives  0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
Others. not working  0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Income  -9.96-3 (0.00) -9.97-3 (0.00) -4.82-3 (0.00) 
Age  6.95-4 (0.00) 6.95-4 (0.00) 9.31-4 (0.00) 
Gender: Male (female = ref.)   0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)     
Country village  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Town or small city  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Big city  -0.03 (0.00) -0.03 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Church attendance: (never = ref.)     
Attendance once a week  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Attendance once a month  -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Attendance rarely  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Country characteristics     
Unemployment: 2002   -8.12-3 (0.00) -5.85-3 (0.00) 
GDP: 2002   -9.65-3 (0.00) -1.01-3 (0.00) 
Non-western non-nationals: 2000   7.11-3 (0.01) 4.14-3 (0.01) 
Net migration: 1995-2000   0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2    -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 
Intermediate characteristics     
Left-right placement    9.17-3 (0.00) 
Perceived unsafety     7.08-3 (0.00) 
Social distrust    6.05-3 (0.00) 
Political distrust    5.50-3 (0.00) 
Perceived ethnic threat     0.68 (0.03) 
Variance components     
Individual  0.057 0.053 0.053 0.040 
(Percentage explained)  (7.96) (7.96) (29.51) 
Country 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.003 
(Percentage explained)  (11.34) (36.14) (57.48) 
Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.05, italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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When we compare the parameters of Models 3 and 4, Model 4 reveals that these 
intermediate characteristics reduce the effects previously ascertained in Model 3 of 
educational attainment and income. Moreover, the intermediate characteristics reduce 
differences between occupational and residential categories; some differences like the one 
between unemployed people and higher professionals are even reduced to non-significance 
(compare these parameters in Model 3 and 4). We also found that the effects of the GDP 
and unemployment were reduced to insignificance (cf. Models 3 and 4). The latter findings 
all imply that these intermediate characteristics actually explain, at least to some extent, 
why people in non-privileged positions (in terms of education, occupation and income) or 
people in the countryside resist relatively strongly to immigrants: it is (partially) due to 
distrust and perceptions of unsafety and particularly due to the perception of collective 
ethnic threat that stands out as the most important determinant of this type of resistance1.  
 
4.3.2 Resistance to asylum seekers 
 
Turning to Table 2a with the different multi-level models to explain resistance to asylum 
seekers, which turned out to be far less widely spread than resistance to immigrants, we 
present a picture that strongly resembles the models on resistance to immigrants. 
Differences between countries are significant as well as differences between social 
categories. However, adding country characteristics does not contribute significantly to the 
explanation. Adding intermediate characteristics turns out to be very important in terms of 
model fit. 
 
Table2a. Different multi-level models on resistance to asylum seekers 
(*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 135.836  
1 + random variation at country level 132.864 2.972* 1
2 +individual characteristics 128.876 3.988* 21
3 +country characteristics 128.872 4 5
4 +intermediate characteristics 119.695 9.177* 5
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In Model 2 of Table 2b we find that the effect of educational attainment is, again, negative. 
We find similar, although less pronounced differences between occupational categories: 
people performing manual labour resist more strongly, but so do retired people and the 
self-employed too. The negative effect of income again reaches significance: the lower 
someone’s income, the more they resist asylum seekers. The older someone is, the more 
resistance they show to asylum seekers. The finding that males resist asylum seekers more 
strongly than females is worth mentioning. People living in the (suburbs of) big cities 
appear to resist asylum seekers less strongly than people residing in the countryside. We 
find no differences between people who attend religious services and people who never 
attend. 
 
Model 3 of Table 2b shows that none of the effects of contextual characteristics reach 
significance. Yet, we would like to mention that the effect of the GDP and that related to 
the influx and presence of minorities are in the direction we proposed which does not hold 
for the effect of unemployment.  
 
Turning to the effects of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4, we again find that 
these are all in the direction we proposed: the more right wing someone is, the more they 
distrust other people or political leaders, the more they perceive themselves as being unsafe 
or more specifically threatened by the presence of allochthonous people and consequently 
the more they resist asylum seekers. Inclusion of these determinants in the model increases 
the explained variances at both levels. Moreover, these determinants reduce the effects of 
educational attainment and income, and reduce differences between all occupational and 
residential categories to non-significance, implying that the previously ascertained 
differences between these categories are (partially) due to these intermediate 
characteristics. 
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Table 2b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to asylum 
seekers; standard errors in brackets (N=30915) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.44 (0.01) 0.44 (0.02) 0.44 (0.01) 0.44 (0.01) 
Individual characteristics     
Education (in years)  -0.59-2 (0.00) -0.59-2 (0.00) -0.15-2 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)     
Lower professionals  -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Routine non-manuals  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Self-employed people  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Students  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Retired people  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Housewives  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) 
Others. not working  0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Income  -5.27-3 (0.00) -5.27-3 (0.00) -1.19-3 (0.00) 
Age  8.07-4 (0.00) 8.06-4 (0.00) 7.17-4 (0.00) 
Gender: Male (female = ref.)   0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)     
Country village  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Town or small city  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Big city  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Church attendance: (never = ref.)     
Attendance once a week  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) 
Attendance once a month  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Attendance rarely  -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
     
Country characteristics     
Unemployment: 2002   -0.59-3 (0.00) 0.43-3 (0.00) 
GDP: 2002   -3.95-3 (0.00)  1.92-3 (0.00) 
Non-western non-nationals: 2000   0.29-3 (0.01) -1.73-3 (0.01) 
Net migration: 1995-2000   0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2    0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Intermediate characteristics     
Left-right placement    6.10-3 (0.00) 
Perceived unsafety     4.00-3 (0.00) 
Social distrust    3.90-3 (0.00) 
Political distrust    4.53-3 (0.00) 
Perceived ethnic threat     0.47 (0.03) 
Variance components     
Individual  0.035 0.034 0.034 0.028 
(Percentage explained)  (2.38) (2.38) (19.38) 
Country 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 
(Percentage explained)  (0.00) (14.25) (45.24) 
Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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4.3.3 Resistance to diversity 
 
Now, let us consider the multi-level models on resistance to diversity, a view shared by 
half of the samples under consideration. Quite a different picture emerges from Table 3a, 
particularly for the contribution of the country characteristics to the explanation that, 
judging from the improvement of the fit, appears to be worthwhile. This table also shows 
that the differences between countries and categories are significant which also holds true 
for the intermediate characteristics that again appear to be quite important. 
 
Table 3a. Different multi-level models on resistance to diversity (*=significant 
improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 143.505   
1 + random variation at country level 139.980 3.525* 1 
2 +individual characteristics 134.009 5.971* 21 
3 +country characteristics 133.985 24* 5 
4 +intermediate characteristics 125.738  8.247* 5 
 
Table 3b, Model 2, then, again shows that the higher someone’s educational attainment, the 
less they resist diversity. Differences between occupational categories remain significant: 
people performing manual work, people who depend on social security or who run a 
household as well as self-employed people stand out.  
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Table 3b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to diversity; 
standard errors in brackets (N=30915) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.55 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.51 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 
Individual characteristics     
Education (in years)  -0.93-2 (0.00) -0.93-2 (0.00) -0.50-2 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)     
Lower professionals   0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) 
Routine non-manuals  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Students  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Retired people  0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Housewives  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Others, not working  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Income  -3.66-3 (0.00) -3.68-3 (0.00) -1.07-3 (0.00) 
Age  5.94-4 (0.00) 5.93-4 (0.00) 7.18-4 (0.00) 
Gender: Male (female = ref.)   0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)     
Country village  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
Town or small city  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Big city  -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Church attendance: (never = ref.)     
Attendance once a week   0.04 (0.01)  0.04 (0.00)  0.04 (0.00) 
Attendance once a month   0.02 (0.01)  0.02 (0.00)  0.02 (0.00) 
Attendance rarely  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Country characteristics     
Unemployment: 2002   -0.94-3 (0.00) -0.97-3 (0.00) 
GDP: 2002   -1.01-2 (0.00) -4.49-3 (0.00) 
Non-western non-nationals: 2000   7.35-3 (0.01) 5.30-3 (0.01) 
Net migration: 1995-2000   0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2    -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Intermediate characteristics     
Left-right placement    9.19-3 (0.00) 
Perceived unsafety     3.13-3 (0.00) 
Social distrust    1.96-3 (0.00) 
Political distrust    0.87-3 (0.00) 
Perceived ethnic threat     0.49 (0.04) 
Variance components     
Individual  0.044 0.040 0.040 0.034 
(Percentage explained)  (7.77) (7.77) (21.63) 
Country 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 
(Percentage explained)  (30.96) (81.62) (71.68) 
Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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Rather remarkable is the finding that resistance to diversity is also more strongly supported 
by routine non-manuals and students, in comparison to higher professionals. The latter 
finding is the more remarkable since students in general disassociate themselves from most 
exclusionist stances. The effect of income is negative and the effect of age is positive. 
Nearly all residential categories resist less strongly to diversity than the people living in the 
countryside. In terms of religiosity, we find a rather straightforward linear effect: the more 
frequently people attend religious services, the more strongly they resist diversity, This 
effect is quite dissimilar to the effects we previously ascertained, yet plausible since this 
measurement also refers to different religions.  
 
Next, we turn to the effects of the country characteristics in Model 3. We find that the 
higher the GDP of the country is, the lower the resistance to diversity. The presence and 
influx of immigrants appears to increase resistance to diversity as indicated by the 
parameters accompanying the proportion of non-western non-nationals and the net 
migration in previous years. However, the effect of asylum applications does not reach 
significance which also holds true for the negative effect of unemployment.  
Inclusion of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4 once again increases the 
proportions of explained variance and reduces some of the effects of individual 
characteristics. Moreover these intermediate characteristics reduce the previously 
ascertained effects of country characteristics. Each of the intermediate characteristics 
reaches significance, except for political distrust. A comparison of the parameters in Model 
3 to Model 4 shows that the effects of the GDP and non-western non-nationals decrease 
whereas the effects of net migration are reduced to non-significance which implies that 
these effects are intervened by political orientations, perceptions of unsafety, social distrust 
and particularly perceptions of collective ethnic threat which has, again, the strongest 
effect.  
 
4.3.4 Favour ethnic distance 
 
Next, we consider the phenomenon of avoiding social contact with allochthonous citizens, 
subscribed to by a minority of the samples under study. The different multi-level models 
suggest a picture similar to that we ascertained regarding resistance to immigrants and 
asylum seekers. Differences between countries and social categories are rather strong and 
significant but the contribution of country characteristics is quite minor and non-significant 
as indicated by a comparison of Model 3 and 4.  
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Table 4a. Different multi-level models on in favour of ethnic distance (*=significant 
improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 157.467  
1 + random variation at country level 155.605 1.862* 1
2 +individual characteristics 149.761 5.844* 21
3 +country characteristics 149.758 3 5
4 +intermediate characteristics 141.948  7.810* 5
 
Then again, the contribution of the intermediate characteristics turns out to be major. Let us 
have a look at the parameter estimates. 
Model 2 of Table 4b shows again that educational attainment has a negative effect: the 
longer someone’s education, the less they favour ethnic distance. Differences between 
occupational categories are similar to differences we have already ascertained: people 
performing manual work and unemployed people stand out followed by people not 
involved in the labour market (such as retired people, people running a household and 
others who do not work) but also by self-employed people. Again, routine non-manuals 
appear to differ from the reference category which does not hold for lower professionals 
and students who take a view similar to higher professionals. The effect of income does not 
reach significance. The older people are, the more they favour ethnic distance. Males 
favour ethnic distance more than females. Nearly all residential categories favour ethnic 
distance less than the people living in the countryside. All categories of people who attend 
religious services favour ethnic distance more than people who never attend religious 
services.  
Including the effects of country characteristics in Model 3 appears to be in vain: none of 
the country characteristics appear to reach significance. Yet, we recognise that the effects 
of the GDP, net migration and asylum applications are in the direction we proposed which 
does not hold true for the level of unemployment and the presence of non-western non-
nationals. 
Inclusion, in Model 4, of the effects of the intermediate characteristics strongly increases 
the explained variance at both levels. However, the effects of social and political distrust do 
not appear to reach significance. The other intermediate characteristics are significant in 
the direction we proposed, but they hardly reduce the previously ascertained effects of 
individual characteristics, except for education and some of the differences between 
occupational categories.  
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Table 4b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of ethnic 
distance; standard errors in brackets (N=30915) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.30 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 
Individual characteristics     
Education (in years)  -1.00-2 (0.00) -1.00-2 (0.00) -0.53-2 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)     
Lower professionals   0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) 
Routine non-manuals  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Students  0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Retired people  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Housewives  0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Others, not working  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Income  -1.53-3 (0.00) -1.57-3 (0.00) 1.73-3 (0.00) 
Age  1.16-3 (0.00) 1.16-3 (0.00) 1.17-3 (0.00) 
Gender: Male (female = ref.)   0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)     
Country village  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) 
Town or small city  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.00) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Big city  -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Church attendance: (never = ref.)     
Attendance once a week   0.05 (0.01)  0.05 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01) 
Attendance once a month   0.03 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01)  0.02 (0.00) 
Attendance rarely  0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Country characteristics     
Unemployment: 2002   -0.55-3 (0.00) 0.93-3 (0.00) 
GDP: 2002   -5.31-3 (0.00) 0.78-3 (0.00) 
Non-western non-nationals: 2000   -2.64-3 (0.01) -4.46-3 (0.01) 
Net migration: 1995-2000   0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2     0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Intermediate characteristics     
Left-right placement    9.16-3 (0.00) 
Perceived unsafety     1.78-2 (0.00) 
Social distrust    0.67-3 (0.00) 
Political distrust    0.45-3 (0.00) 
Perceived ethnic threat     0.57 (0.03) 
Variance components     
Individual  0.070 0.066 0.066 0.058 
(Percentage explained)  (5.11) (5.11) (17.16) 
Country 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 
(Percentage explained)  (20.74) (39.26) (69.05) 
Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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4.3.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal immigrants 
 
Now, we turn to the fifth dimension of ethnic exclusionism in this report, the view that 
criminal immigrants should be made to leave, favoured by a vast majority of the samples. 
The results in Table 5a for the multi-level Models 1 and 2 tell us that there are significant 
differences between countries and social categories. Moreover, adding country 
characteristics (Model 3) appears to contribute to the fit of the model as does the inclusion 
of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4. 
 
Table 5a. Different multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies 
(*=significant improvement of model fit) 
Models -2*loglikelihood ∆-2*loglikelihood ∆df 
0 Intercept (Individual level variation) 151.858  
1 + random variation at country level 147.624 4.234* 1
2 +individual characteristics 141.679 5.945* 21
3 +country characteristics 141.662 17* 5
4 +intermediate characteristics 133.964  7.698* 5
 
Table 5b, Model 2, shows again a negative effect for educational attainment. Typically, 
similar occupational categories stand to favour repatriation policies for criminal 
immigrants: people performing manual work and people outside of the labour market. 
Again we find that self-employed people and routine non-manuals favour these policies. 
Remarkably, also lower professionals stand out as being in favour of these policies. which 
we have not found in previous instances. The negative effect for income reaches 
significance. The older someone is, the stronger they favour these policies. Males appear to 
be less in favour of repatriation policies than females are. All residential categories favour 
these policies less than the people living in the countryside. Among people who attend 
religious services we only find people who rarely attend to be more in favour of 
repatriation policies than people who never attend.  
In terms of country characteristics presented in Model 3, we find that the effect of the GDP 
reaches significance: the higher the country’s GDP, the less support there is for repatriation 
policies for criminal immigrants which is consistent with previous findings. We also find 
that the higher the net migration has been (over the years 1995-2000), the more support for 
such policies exists. The other effects of country characteristics do not reach significance. 
Yet, we ascertained that the effect of the proportion of non-national non-westerners is in 
the direction we proposed which does not hold for the effects of unemployment and asylum 
applications.  
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Table 5b.   Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation 
policies; standard errors in brackets (N=30915) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.69 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02) 0.68 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01) 
Individual characteristics     
Education (in years)  -0.88-2 (0.00) -0.88-2 (0.00) -0.41-2 (0.00) 
Occupation: (higher profess.= ref.)     
Lower professionals   0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) 
Routine non-manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Self-employed people  0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Skilled manuals  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 
Unskilled manuals  0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 
Students  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Unemployed people  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Retired people  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Housewives  0.05 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Others, not working  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Income  -8.78-3 (0.00) -8.75-3 (0.00) -0.26-3 (0.00) 
Age  9.31-4 (0.00) 9.34-4 (0.00) 1.04-3 (0.00) 
Gender: Male (female = ref.)   -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)     
Country village  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Town or small city  -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Suburbs or outskirts of big city  -0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Big city  -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Church attendance: (never = ref.)     
Attendance once a week   -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01) 
Attendance once a month  -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Attendance rarely  0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
Country characteristics     
Unemployment: 2002   -3.84-3 (0.00) -2.18-3 (0.00) 
GDP: 2002   -1.36-2 (0.00) -0.74-2 (0.00) 
Non-western non-nationals: 2000   4.72-3 (0.01) 2.98-3 (0.01) 
Net migration: 1995-2000   0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Asylum applications: 2001-2     -0.01 (0.01)  -0.02 (0.01) 
Intermediate characteristics     
Left-right placement    8.27-3 (0.00) 
Perceived unsafety     1.21-2 (0.00) 
Social distrust    1.98-3 (0.00) 
Political distrust    6.02-3 (0.00) 
Perceived ethnic threat     0.48 (0.04) 
Variance components     
Individual  0.055 0.051 0.051 0.044 
(Percentage explained)  (7.35) (7.35) (19.31) 
Country 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.002 
(Percentage explained)  (12.68) (67.34) (77.17) 
Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p 
< 0.10. 
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Finally, we turn to ascertain effects of intermediate characteristics that all appear to be 
significant. The more right wing people are, the more they perceive that they are unsafe, 
the more they distrust other people and political leaders, and the more they perceive 
allochthonous citizens as a collective threat and consequently the stronger they favour the 
policy of repatriating criminal immigrants. Inclusion of these intermediate characteristics 
increases the percentage of explained variance and moreover reduces some of the effects of 
individual and contextual conditions which can be ascertained by comparing Model 3 to 
Model 4. The effects of educational attainment and age are strongly reduced which also 
holds true for the effect of income that is reduced to non-significance. Differences between 
some of the occupational categories are reduced, particularly differences between 
categories outside of the labour market and higher professionals. Finally, we find that the 
effect of the GDP and net migration are reduced. All these reductions (in effects) imply that 
the support that exists in these social categories. respectively countries. may partially be 
due to these intermediate characteristics of which. again. the perception of collective ethnic 
threat stands out as being the most decisive determinant. in terms of direct effects. 
 
4.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses 
 
After these elaborate descriptions of the results of the multivariate multi-level models, we 
will evaluate these findings from the perspective of the hypotheses we previously derived 
from theories explicated in Report 1. 
 
We proposed to test, regarding individual conditions, whether social categories of people in 
somewhat similar social positions to those of minorities support different dimensions of 
ethnic exclusionism more than average – hypotheses 1a to 1e.1 Just as in most previous 
instances, except for the candidate countries, we first found that people who had not 
attained high levels of education supported all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism more 
strongly, which clearly corroborates Hypothesis 1a. Secondly, we found that particular 
occupational categories such as skilled and unskilled workers, but also people outside of 
the labour market, some of whom are dependent on social security, turned out to support 
ethnic exclusionism quite consistently. These findings clearly support Hypothesis 1b and 
1c. Moreover, we found that self-employed people in particular as well as people who 
                                                          
1 Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of 
the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, 
more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education; b) manual workers; c) 
unemployed people; d) people with a low income; and e) people living in urban areas. 
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perform routine non-manual work supported most of the dimensions of ethnic 
exclusionism. We also found clear support for Hypothesis 1d: people with rather low 
household incomes turned out to be consistently more in favour of ethnic exclusionism. 
Yet, the evidence we found clearly refuted Hypothesis 1e: we found that not people living 
in major cities where the majority of the minorities live, but instead, the people living in the 
countryside turned out to quite consistently support all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. 
Taking all of these findings together corroborates a central proposition of Ethnic 
Competition Theory, i.e. that all of those categories that presumably hold similar (less 
privileged) positions on or close to the labour market, just like allochthonous people, 
favour ethnic exclusionism. This apparently does not hold true for people living close to 
allochthonous people in big cities who rather consistently disassociate themselves form 
ethnic exclusionism. 
Regarding contextual conditions, related to the state of the country where respondents live, 
we proposed to test hypotheses 3a to 3d on the economic and demographic situation. 2 We 
found rather weak, non-significant yet positive effects of the presence of non-western non-
nationals on most dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. We would like to mention that most 
of these effects were found to be in the direction we proposed to test, but only the effect on 
resistance to diversity reached significance. These findings do not convincingly corroborate 
Hypothesis 3a derived from Ethnic Competition Theory. The effects of net migration were 
consistently positive and regarding resistance to diversity and support for repatriation 
policies they reached significance. These findings imply that Hypothesis 3b is partially 
confirmed. This does not hold for Hypothesis 3c on applications for asylum: the effects of 
this contextual condition were found to be non-significant and inconsistent. Therefore, we 
have to refute this hypothesis. Considering these demographic conditions more generally, 
we conclude that, in spite of the fact that many effects were non-significant, the effects that 
turned out to reach significance were generally in line with Ethnic Competition Theory: 
ethnic exclusionism turned out to be more prevalent in nations where the proportion of 
non-western non-nationals or the influx of migrants is higher. Regarding economic 
conditions, we found that the effect of the level of unemployment in the countries under 
consideration was consistently negative, but rarely reached significance, and then only for 
resistance to immigrants. Therefore, we have to refute Hypothesis 3d. We found consistent 
                                                          
2 Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level 
of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) 
a relatively high proportion of resident migrants; b) a relatively high level of 
immigrants; c) a relatively high number of asylum seekers; d) a high proportion of 
unemployment. 
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evidence on another economic condition pertaining to the effects of national economy of 
countries: the effect of the GDP proved to be negative, that is, the higher the level of the 
GDP, the lower the level of ethnic exclusionism in the country, that is the less resistance to 
immigrants, the less resistance to diversity and the less support for repatriation policies.  
 
Since this effect showed up in a majority of exclusionist instances, we may conclude that 
this evidence supports Hypothesis 4b. 3 Generally speaking, ethnic exclusionism prevails to 
a lesser extent in more prosperous societies, which is in line with Ethnic Competition 
Theory. 
 
Let us finally turn to the hypotheses on individual perceptions. We found that most if not 
all of these intermediating characteristics proved to have the effects we proposed in Report 
1:4 perceptions of decreasing personal safety (implied in Hypothesis 2b), social and 
political distrust (Hypothesis 2c) and more particularly the perception of collective ethnic 
threat (mentioned in Hypothesis 2a) contribute very consistently to the explanation of all 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. This evidence clearly supports Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 
2c, and hence corroborates some crucial propositions building on Ethnic Competition 
Theory. Not mentioned in these hypotheses, yet taken into account, is the political 
orientation of Europeans. We rather consistently found that a right wing orientation 
increases ethnic exclusionism. Moreover, we found that these intermediating characteristics 
more often reduced the initial effects of individual and/or contextual conditions implying 
that they actually – at least partially – explain the relationships between these conditions 
and exclusionist stances. 
 
Note
                                                          
3 Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the 
GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce 
possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition. 
4  Hypothesis 2: Ethnic exclusionism will be affected by: a) perception of collective ethnic 
threat; b) perception of personal threat; and c) political and social distrust. 
                                                          
1 This information cannot be derived from the parameters in the table. Strictly speaking, we 
would have to present additionally so-called standardised parameters which then would be 
detrimental to the surveyability of the table. Yet, the information on these standardised 
parameters justifying such statements is available with the authors. 
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Appendix 1. List of country abbreviations 
 
In the report’s figures ISO 3166-1-Alpha-2 codes are used to present the various European 
countries (International Organization for Standardization, 2004). These codes are listed 
below in geographical order from North to South and from West to East. To these standard 
codes we added Germany West (DEW) and Germany East (DEE).  
 
Country Code Region 
Finland FI Nordic 
Sweden SE Nordic 
Denmark DK Nordic 
United Kingdom GB Western Europe 
Ireland IE Western Europe 
Netherlands NL Western Europe 
Belgium BE Western Europe 
Luxembourg LU Western Europe 
Germany – West DEW Western Europe 
Germany – East DEE Eastern Europe 
Austria AT Western Europe 
Spain ES Mediterranean 
Portugal PT Mediterranean 
Italy IT Mediterranean 
Greece GR Mediterranean 
Poland PL Eastern Europe 
Czech Republic CZ Eastern Europe 
   
Hungary HU Eastern Europe 
Slovenia SI Eastern Europe 
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Appendix 2. Data collection 
 
The European Social Survey (ESS 2004a) is a new survey covering 22 countries. The ESS 
has two main aims. First, ‘to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values 
within Europe..’ and second ‘to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-
sectional survey measurement in Europe and beyond’ (ESS 2004b). The ESS project is 
funded by the European Commission’s 5th Framework Programme, the European Science 
Foundation and academic funding bodies in participating countries. The ESS team 
emphasises the exceptional high standards of the design and of the operation of the project. 
 
In the analyses of report 4, we selected those countries that either were member of the 
European Union or a candidate country in winter 2003/2004, when the actual data analyses 
were executed. Except for France, for which the data were not yet available, all member 
states were present in the ESS data set. With regard to the candidate countries, we could 
select four countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Data on Israel, 
Norway and Switzerland were dropped from the data set. 
 
For a very neat data description and sampling procedure we would like to refer to the ESS 
data documentation (ESS 2004b; Jowell et al. 2003). Here we limit ourselves to some basic 
information. It is important to emphasise that much attention has been paid to the 
formulations of the questions in the interviews. Scientific meetings were held to evaluate 
possible items to be included in the survey. Moreover, rigorous translation protocols were 
used. Respondent selection involved a strict random probability sampling. The fieldwork 
took place between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. In Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark and 
Italy, the fieldwork lasted until the summer of 2003. In all countries face to face interviews 
were conducted. The response target aimed at was very high: it was set at 70%. Therefore, 
much attention was paid to the training of the interviewees. In quite some countries, the 
response rate was indeed higher than often reported in previous data collections (e.g. the 
Eurobarometer), but the 70% norm was not met in most countries (see Table A4.2.1). 
Detailed information on country specific stratification of samples can be found in the 
country reports as provided by the ESS team in the ESS Documentation Report 2002 / 
2003.  
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Table A4.2.1 Number of completed interviews and response rate by country 
 Total number of 
completed 
interviews 
 
 
Response rate 
 
Field work 
period 
% of respondents 
with country’s 
nationality 
Finland 1779 73.2% 09/02 – 12/02 98.5% 
Sweden 1711 68.5% 09/02 – 12/02 97.1% 
Denmark 1506 67.6% 10/02 – 06/03 97.2% 
Great Britain 1813 55.5% 09/02 – 04/03 97.1% 
Ireland 1923 64.5% 12/02 – 04/03 96.7% 
Netherlands 2347 67.9% 09/02 – 02/03 98.1% 
Belgium 1899 59.2% 10/02 - 04/03 94.9% 
Luxembourg 1552 43.9% 04/03 – 08/03 69.5% 
Germany 2896 57.1% 11/02 – 05/03 95.9% 
Austria 2257 60.4% 02/03 - 09/031 95.8% 
Spain 1729 53.2% 11/02 – 01/03 97.3% 
Portugal 1511 68.8% 09/02 – 01/03 97.9% 
Italy 1207 43.7% 01/03 – 06/03 99.8% 
Greece 2566 80.0% 01/03 – 03/03 94.7% 
Poland 2110 73.2% 09/02 – 12/02 100.0% 
Czech Republic 1322 43.3% 11/02 – 03/03 99.4% 
Hungary 1655 69.9% 10/02 – 11/02 99.8% 
Slovenia 1519 72.1% 10/02 – 11/02 99.7% 
1 Fieldwork in two waves 
 
2.1 Weighting 
 
For the European Social Survey, weights were constructed by the ESS team. The samples 
are weighted by differences in probabilities of selection in the sample. These selection 
weights are very small though. They consist of corrections of under or over representation 
of people in certain types of address or household, such as those in larger households. This 
weight does not correct for variation in response between different groups in the sample. 
Moreover, we constructed a weight to adjust to a standard size of 1750 interviews for each 
sample (875 for Luxembourg). 
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2.2 Selection of majority population 
 
As the reports aim to describe the majorities’ attitudes of each country, we decided to select 
only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country. Particularly in 
Luxembourg, a vast percentage had to be dropped (30.5%), which is consistent with 
population figures for Luxembourg and previous findings in the Eurobarometer data. For 
Greece and Belgium, also more than 5% of the respondents did not have the nationality of 
the respective countries. For other countries, the percentage is below 5%, and for Eastern 
European countries and Italy even below 1%. 
 
2.3 Missing value treatment 
 
We selected respondents based on their valid scores on the dependent variables. We first 
tested whether the items referring to ethnic exclusionism can be regarded as valid, reliable 
and cross-national comparable measurements. In these analyses, extensively described in 
appendix 3, we only included respondents that answered all 20 items. Respondents with 
missing answers on one or more of the 20 items were excluded from these analyses. 
 
Having assessed that these 20 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement 
for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we treated respondents with missing 
answers as follows. In order to avoid severe reductions in the numbers of respondents, we 
performed a well-considered procedure previously used and published in scientific 
journals. From the 20 items on exclusionist stances, we took the criterion that at least 50% 
should have been answered. This lead to a selection of 98.5% of the respondents. In other 
words, only 1.5% had not answered more than half of the items. 
 
Missing values of respondents, providing that they had answered more than 50% of the 
items, were replaced by missing value substitution based on regression estimation. As the 
items correlated positively with each other (as expected), we regressed an item on all other 
items referring to exclusionist stances. In this manner, a missing score of a respondent on a 
particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by an estimate based on the 
answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. 
Substituted values were then rounded into the valid values of the original item.
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Table A4.2.2 Percentages of respondents with missing values on the measurement 
of the dependent variables, percentages of respondents with 10 
missing values or less (which were substituted) and percentage of 
respondents with no missing value 
 % respondents with 11 or 
more missing values 
(dropped from analyses)
 
% of respondents with 
1 to 10 missing values
 
% respondents with no 
missing values 
Finland 0.8 8.4 90.8 
Sweden 1.1 22.2 76.8 
Denmark 2.0 23.7 74.3 
Great Britain 0.2 11.7 88.1 
Ireland 1.2 25.5 73.3 
Netherlands 0.3 13.8 85.9 
Belgium 0.8 19.5 79.8 
Luxembourg 1.0 44.9 54.1 
Germany West 0.1 18.3 81.6 
Germany East 0.3 16.8 82.9 
Austria 1.5 34.4 64.1 
Spain 4.5 38.8 56.7 
Portugal 3.0 42.7 54.2 
Italy 2.4 24.3 73.3 
Greece 1.2 22.3 76.5 
Poland 2.6 32.7 64.7 
Czech Republic 2.3 39.0 58.7 
Hungary 2.4 40.0 57.6 
Slovenia 1.4 21.7 76.9 
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Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism 
 
The European Social Survey (ESS) provides valid measurements of some of the 
phenomena described in Report 1. In Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 we present which particular 
dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are theoretically expected to be measured by the items. 
This conceptualisation of items and dimensions builds on the conceptual analysis provided 
in Report 1.  
 
In this section, we test whether the items presented in figures 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 can 
indeed be applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. We test this by 
means of structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the 
LISREL computer programme, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b), equivalently to the description provided for the measurements in 
the Eurobarometer data in Reports 2 and 3. Whether, and to what extent, the applied 
indicators indeed refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be 
examined by means of the measurement model. The measurement sub model of a full 
structural equation model describes the causal links between the unobserved theoretical 
concepts or latent variables and the observed or manifest variables. 
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d5: allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic
group from majority (1= allow many; 4 = allow
d7: allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in
Europe  
d9: allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries
outside Europe (1= allow many; 4 = allow none) 
d54: financial support to refugee applicants while cases
considered (1 = agree strongly; 5 = disagree
d50: refugee applicants allowed to work while cases
considered  
d55: granted refugees should be entitled to bring close
family members (1 = agree strongly; 5 = disagree
resistance to  
immigrants 
resistance to 
 asylum seekers 
Figure 4.3.1 Theoretical measurement model ESS 
 ‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘resistance to asylum seekers’ 
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d40: it is better for a country if almost everyone share
customs and traditions (1 = agree strongly; 5 =
disagree strongly; recoded) 
d41: it is better for a county if there is a variety of
different religions (1 = agree strongly; 5 =
disagree strongly) 
resistance to  
diversity 
favour repatriation 
policies 
for criminal  migrants 
Figure 4.3.2 Theoretical measurement model ESS 
‘resistance to diversity’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants’ 
d23: If immigrants commit serious crime they should
be made to leave (1 = agree strongly; 5 =
disagree strongly; recoded)
d24: If immigrants commit any crime they should be
made to leave (1 = agree strongly; 5 = disagree
strongly; recoded) 
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favour ethnic distance 
perceived collective  
ethnic threat 
Figure 4.3.3 Theoretical measurement model ESS 
‘favour ethnic distance’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ 
d25: do immigrants take jobs away in (country) or
create new jobs (0 = take away jobs; 10 = create
d34: mind if your boss is an immigrant of the same
race/ethnic group as majority (0 = mind not at
all; 10 = mind a lot)
d35: mind if a close relative is married to an immigrant
of the same race/ethnic group as majority (0 =
mind not at all; 10 = mind a lot)
d36: mind if your boss is an immigrant of a different
race/ethnic group as majority (0 = mind not at
all; 10 = mind a lot) 
d37: mind if a close relative is married to an immigrant
of a different race/ethnic group as majority (0 =
mind not at all; 10 = mind a lot)
d27: is immigration bad or good for (country’s)
economy (0 = bad for the economy; 10 = good
d28: is the (country’s) cultural life undermined or
enriched by immigrants (0 = cultural life
undermined; 10 = cultural life enriched; recoded)
d29: do immigrants make (country) worse or better
place to live (0 = worse place to live; 10 = better
d26: taxes and services: do immigrants take out more
than they put in (0 = generally take out more; 10
= generally put in more; recoded)
d30: do immigrants make (country’s) crime problems
worse or better  (0 = crime problems made
worse; 10 = crime problems made better;
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An important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of 
comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international 
comparable measurement of exclusionist attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that 
theoretical concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different 
countries, then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-
sample analysis, that is. the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from 
several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the 
equivalence of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess 
whether, and to what extent. the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in 
these different national settings. 
The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in 
measurement equations. generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):  
 
xq = λq1ξ1 + λq2ξ2 + ... + δq (with q = 1, 2, .., the number of manifest variables x). 
 
The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix 
notation is:  
 
x = Λx ξ + δ 
 
Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (Σ) is defined as: 
 
Σ = ΛxΦΛx′ + Θδ 
 
The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows: 
 
Variables:  x is a q x 1 vector of observed indicators of ξ 
   ξ is a n x 1 vector of latent variables (common factors) 
δ is a q x 1 vector of measurement errors (unique factors) 
of x 
Coefficients:  Λx is a q x n matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the  
    regression of x on ξ  
Covariance matrices: Φ is a n x n covariance matrix of ξ 
 Θδ is a q x q covariance matrix of δ 
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The parameters in Λx (lambda x), Φ(phi), and Θδ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, 
constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or 
parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free 
parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent 
variables is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed 
variables (i.e. fixing a factor loading to one). 
The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This 
statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model 
that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test 
is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently 
large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and 
Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square 
statistic as a measure of fit rather than as a formal test statistic. In this view, the Chi-square 
statistic is a measure of the overall ‘badness-of-fit’ of the model to the data; the larger the 
Chi-square value, the worse the fit of the model. 
Based on the aforementioned notions, we therefore preferred not to search for a 
measurement model with a ‘perfect’ fit (i.e. a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead 
to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model 
has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-
square statistic, we assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-
fit measures such as GFI and RMSEA.1  
 
As stated in the previous section, we started the search for an internationally comparable 
measurement instrument of ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. Each item is 
assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-
nationally equivalent indicators for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism we 
applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, we excluded indicators that 
were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed 
examination of the parameter estimates. That is, we subsequently removed items that were 
hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance (R² < .20 
on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable 
indicator for the proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before 
excluding such an item from further analyses, we checked whether the specific item should 
not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a different (dimension of a) theoretical 
concept than the one we initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a 
considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix of factor loadings, 
indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e. allowing a relationship 
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between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the 
fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were 
also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – 
referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied 
to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this 
manner, we selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be 
regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators.  
 
Firstly, we assumed that the form of the measurement model is the same in the different 
countries.2 That is, the parameter matrices (Λx, Φ, and Θδ) of the measurement models in 
the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same 
numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. 
Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the same 
theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-
dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the 
theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model 
therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed 
variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other. With respect to comparability 
across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in 
parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries. If we 
found problems for countries with respect to relatively bad fit, we decided to add country 
specific error variance correlations or double loadings. For the double loadings we used the 
criterion that it should be at least .20 smaller than the loadings of the other indicators on the 
same phenomenon. 
 
The second model assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant 
relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor 
loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect 
to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable.3 If this model is 
acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are being tapped in the 
different countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986).  
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3.1 Invariance in measurement models in countries of the 
European Social Survey 2003 (ESS), regarding measurements 
of ‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘resistance to asylum 
seekers’ 
 
The ESS data contain some measurements that presumably refer to ‘resistance to 
immigrants’. Indeed, at first, the LISREL procedure provided one factor of ‘resistance to 
immigrants’, regardless of the reference in the item formulation to the country of origin 
(respectively, poor or rich countries and from within Europe or outside Europe). However, 
in numerous countries, respondents distinguished between resistance to immigrants from 
richer countries and immigrants from poorer countries, making the measurement 
incomparable between the countries in the ESS dataset. We therefore made a selection of 
items that refer to resistance to immigrants of people from poorer countries, combined with 
the item referring to immigrants of a different race. We expected these items to refer to one 
phenomenon of ‘resistance to immigrants’. 
‘Resistance to asylum seekers’ was measured by three items referring to rights that asylum 
seekers should have while their cases are considered. Question d53 (‘refugees should be 
kept in detention centres while cases are considered’) and d51 (‘government should be 
generous judging applications for refugee status’) did not relate to this exclusionist stance. 
Two other questions regarding refugees were for many people hard to answer, resulting in 
high percentages of missing values, particularly in Portugal and Spain. This was the reason 
to leave out question d49 (‘(country) has more than its fair share of people applying for 
refugee status’) and question d52 (‘most refugee applicants don’t fear persecution in own 
countries’).  
 
First, we tested whether the proposed model as presented in Figure 4.3.1 would fit the 
overall ESS sample.4 This turned out be the case. The largest modification index was for 
the covariance between the measurement errors of d55 (‘granted refugees should be 
entitled to bring close family members’) and d7 (‘allow many/few immigrants from poorer 
countries in Europe’). As overall fit statistics were satisfactory though (see model A1, 
Table A4.3.1), we continued multi-sampling with the more simple model.  
To test equivalence in model form across all countries in the dataset, we followed the 
multi-sample procedure. The overall RMSEA statistic met the criterion, as it was .018 
(Model A2, Table A4.3.1), but Chi-square statistics and the modification indices provided 
information of relatively bad fit for separate countries. Relatively bad fit statistics were 
found for Greece, East Germany, Belgium, Hungary and Luxembourg. Obviously, 
modification indices suggested to free covariances of measurement errors particularly in 
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these countries. Step by step, we freed such measurement error covariances. In the final 
step, the largest modification index was found for Finland. As for Finland the GFI was 
larger than .98 and hence satisfactory, we chose for the simpler model. As for Luxembourg, 
GFI statistics stayed low, we freed the covariance of the measurement errors between d55 
and d7 for the country too, making the GFI increase to .965. The model turned out to fit the 
data well, as for all countries the RMR statistic was lower than .05.  
We then tested this model, providing us with evidence for equivalent model form, for 
invariant factor loadings. As the fit statistics turned out to be satisfactory, as provided in 
table A4.3.1, we can conclude that dimensions of ‘resistance to immigrants’ and 
‘resistance to asylum seekers’ can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same 
indicators. 
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Table A4.3.1  Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 
‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘resistance to asylum seekers’. 
 RMSEA χ2 df GFI CFI Problem 
identification 
Problem 
solved by: 
Model A1: Europe-wide 
(d5,d7,d9; dichotomised) 
(d50,d54,d55) 
 
.008 22.97 8 .9982 .9986 -  
Multi-sample models       
Form equivalence       
Model A2 
 
.018 218.83 152 1) .9837 Large modifi-
cation indices and 
relatively low 
GFI’s in some 
countries 2) 
Freeing 
country 
specific error 
covariances 
 
Model A3 
country specific error 
covariances 
 
.001 142.16 142 3) .9906   
Invariant factor loadings       
Model A4 
country specific error 
covariances 
.014 271.82 212 4) .9871   
Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS 
1) GFI statistics lower than .97 for Greece (.950), East Germany (.963), Belgium (.966), Sweden 
(.964), Hungary (.967) and Luxembourg (.927). 
2) Modification indices were controlled after each analysis. The largest modification index was then 
adjusted, by freeing error covariances; respectively the following modification indices (MI) were 
provided and error covariances were step by step allowed (within parentheses); Belgium MI = 
486.62; (d50, d9); Portugal: MI = 443.32; (d54, d7); Greece: MI=268.56; (d50, d7); The Netherlands: 
(d55, d9); Sweden: MI = 225.45; (d55, d5); Sweden: MI = 1686.17; (d54, d7); Denmark: (d55, d7); 
Germany East: MI = 155.78; (d54, d7). Hereafter, the largest modification index was found for 
Finland, but as statistics were satisfactory for the country, we left the model for Finland unadjusted. 
For Luxembourg, the relatively low GFI was improved by freeing the covariance of the errors of d55 
and d7. 
3) GFI statistics were larger than .97 for all countries, except Luxembourg (.965) and Hungary (.967). 
4) GFI statistics were larger than .97 for all countries, except for Spain (.956) and Hungary (.957). 
Moreover, two additional error covariances were freed: (d55, d50) for Italy and (d54, d7) for the 
Netherlands. 
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d5 
d7 
d50 
d9 
d55 
d54 
resistance to 
immigrants 
resistance to 
 asylum seekers 
Model 1 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities 
‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘resistance to asylum seekers’
1.04
1.00
1.00
1.04
1.55
1.37
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
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3.2 Invariance in measurement models in countries of the 
European Social Survey 2003 (ESS) regarding measurements 
of ‘resistance to diversity’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for 
criminal migrants’ 
 
The European Social Survey contained a number of items that presumably refer to either 
‘resistance to diversity’ or ‘favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants’. However, 
some of these items could not be included in our analysis. In figure 4.3.2 two items are 
displayed referring to repatriation policies. An additional question, d21, refers to 
repatriation in case of unemployment. The statement read: “If people who have come to 
live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave”. 
However, this item had a rather low correlation with the other two ‘repatriation’ items, in 
particular in Southern and Eastern European countries. Hence, we could not include this 
item in a scale of ‘repatriation policies’. 
 
Two additional items (questions d42 and d43) touching upon resistance to diversity could 
also not be included in our analysis. The questions read “It is better for a country if almost 
everyone is able to speak at least one common language” and “Communities of people who 
have come to live here should be allowed to educate their children in their own separate 
schools if they wish”. The correlation between these two items was however rather low 
(overall polychoric correlation was .13), indicating that they cannot be included in a 
reliable measurement scale. Moreover, the relation between these items and d40 and d41 
was even lower in a large number of countries and sometimes these items were even 
negatively related. Therefore, to indicate the ‘resistance to diversity’ we restricted our 
analysis to item d40 and d41. 
 
The proposed measurement model as presented in Figure 3.2. had a rather satisfactory fit in 
an overall analysis of all countries. As shown in Table A4.3.2., the Goodness of Fit statistic 
was very high (.999) and the RMSEA (.032) was well below the boundary value of .05, 
indicating a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom (Browne & Cudeck, 
1992).  
 
However, when we looked at the fit in each separate country, it turned out that the model 
did not fit the data in Luxembourg. This is due to the correlation between the two items of 
‘resistance to diversity’ (d40 and d41). Overall, these two items were moderately related 
with a polychoric correlation of 0.39. In contrast, the polychoric correlation was negative 
(–0.06) in Luxembourg. Hence, in Luxembourg these two items could not be regarded as 
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both referring to the same theoretical construct. We can conclude that ‘resistance to 
diversity’ could not be measured in Luxembourg with a scale consisting of both item d40 
and d41. Due to this anomaly, a multi-sample analysis provided no parameter estimates if 
Luxembourg was included in the analyses. Therefore, we removed Luxembourg from the 
multi-sample analysis, as displayed in Table A4.3.2.  
 
A model with cross-national equivalence in model form had a very satisfactory RMSEA 
statistic of .022. Due to some Heywood5 cases (estimated negative variances of 
measurement errors) we had to fix the measurement error variance of d40 in Eastern 
Germany and of d24 in Italy and Hungary. After these measurement error variances had 
been set to a fixed value of .05, the fit hardly changed. The high value of the Comparative 
Fit Index (.9972) and the satisfactory RMSEA value of .019 indicate that – with the 
exception of Luxembourg – the indicators referred to the same theoretical constructs in 
each country.  
 
Next we tested whether the factor loadings were invariant across countries. Since there 
were no Heywood cases in this model (labelled B2 in Table A4.3.2) no fixation of any 
measurement error variances was required. The model with invariant factor loadings had a 
close fit, as judged by the RMSEA-value. The overall Comparitive Fit Index was very high 
(CFI = .99), as well as the Goodness of Fit index in each separate country. In each national 
sample, the GFI was larger than .99, except for Sweden (.98) and Denmark (.99). These 
findings indicate that – with the exception of Luxembourg – there were no cross-national 
differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which items capture the theoretical 
constructs. Below table A4.3.2 the unstandardised factor loadings are presented. We found 
that in Luxembourg the items d40 and d41 cannot be applied as a reliable measurement 
instrument for ‘resistance to diversity’.  
 
We can conclude that. with the exception of Luxembourg, the dimensions of ‘resistance to 
diversity’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants’ can be equivalently 
measured in all countries by the same indicators.  
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Table A4.3.2  Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 
‘resistance to diversity’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for criminal 
migrants’. 
 RMSEA χ2 df GFI CFI Problem 
identification: 
Problem solved by: 
Overall analysis:  
Europe-wide 
       
Model B1:  
(d40, d41) and (d23, d24) 
.032 32.07 1 .9990 .9980  
      
Multi-sample models      
Form equivalence      
Model B1   19   Cannot be 
estimated for 
Luxembourg 
Removing 
Luxembourg  
Model B2: excluding 
Luxembourg 
.022 32.15 18 .9975Negative error 
variances for d40 
in DE and for d24 
in I, GR, and H 
(Heywood cases) 
Fixation of error 
variances to .05 
Model B3: excluding 
Luxembourg, and fixation 
of the specific error 
variances to .05 
.019 35.16 22 1) .9971  
      
Invariant factor loadings      
Model B2: excluding 
Luxembourg. 
.034 151.99 52 2) .9903  
Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS2002/2003 
1) GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample. 
2) GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample, 
except for Sweden and Denmark (.98). 
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Model 2 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities 
‘resistance to diversity’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants’ 
d4
d4
d2
d2
resistance to 
diversity 
favour repatriation 
policies for criminal 
0.68 
1.00 
1.12 
1.00 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
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3.3 Invariance in measurement models in European countries of 
the European Social Survey 2003 (ESS) regarding 
measurements of ‘favour ethnic distance’ and ‘perceived 
collective ethnic threat’ 
 
In this section we test the proposed measurement model as depicted in Figure 4.3.3. This 
model with 4 items referring to ‘favour ethnic distance’ and 6 items referring to ‘perceived 
collective ethnic threat’ had merely a moderate fit in an overall analysis at the European 
level. As shown in table A4.3.3 the Goodness of Fit index was merely .90 and the RMSEA 
statistic of .091 was rather unsatisfactory as only values below .08 or below .05 are 
regarded as respectively, a reasonable fit or a close fit. 
 
How could we improve the fit of this measurement model? We first took a closer look at 
the correlations and the results from explorative factor analysis. The correlation matrix 
clearly supported the notion of two separate dimensions referring to ‘ethnic distance’ and 
to ‘ethnic threat’. The four items presumably referring to ‘favour ethnic distance’ had very 
high correlations and only moderate correlations with the other six items. The six items 
presumably referring to ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ also had strong correlations. 
Furthermore, explorative factor analyses – at the European level as well as in separate 
countries – provided no clear indications of a factor structure with more dimensions. For 
instance, in each country, exploratory factor analysis of six ‘threat’ items (d25 to d30) 
yielded a one-dimensional factor structure. We also tried to enforce a two-dimensional 
structure on these six ‘threat’ items by means of a confirmatory factor analysis. These 
results indicated that the fit of the measurement model could not be improved by 
distinguishing more dimensions. Instead, we tried to improve the fit by adding covariances 
between measurement error terms. 
 
When we looked at the question formulation of d34 to d37, it became clear that the items 
not only refer to ‘ethnic distance’, but also share more similarities. For instance, items d34 
and d35 have in common that they both refer to ‘an immigrant of the same race/ethnic 
group as the majority’, whereas items d34 and d36 have in common that they both refer to 
the situation in which ‘the boss is an immigrant’. Whereas all four items were highly 
correlated, the correlation matrix also indicated that the correlation between two items was 
even higher when they both referred to the same reference group (‘same’ versus ‘other 
race/ethnic group’) and/or when they both refer to the same social domain (‘a boss’ versus 
‘a close relative’). This can be modelled into the measurement model by incorporating 
covariances between the measurement error terms of the items. In model C2 in Table 
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A4.3.3 we estimated the covariances of the measurement errors between d34 and d35 
(‘same group’), between d36 and d37 (‘other group’), between d34 and d36 (‘boss’) and 
between d35 and d37 (‘a close relative’). The size of a covariance between measurement 
errors indicates the degree to which two items have something in common, besides 
referring to the same theoretical construct of ‘ethnic distance’. 
 
As can be seen in Table A4.3.3, the fit of model C2 was much larger than the previous 
model. The RMSEA statistic was just at the criterion of .05. The fit of the measurement 
model could be further improved be incorporating covariances between the measurement 
errors of the six items referring to ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’. Items d25 to d27 
have in common that the question contents refer to economic issues, whereas the items d28 
to d30 are non-economic statements. Model C3 incorporated measurement error 
covariances between the items referring to ‘economic threat’, that is an covariance between 
the measurement errors of d25 and d26, between d25 and d27, and between d26 and d27. 
In addition, in model C4 covariances between the measurement errors of d28 and d29, 
between d28 and d30, and between d29 and d30 were incorporated. The fit of the 
measurement model gradually improved. Model C4 had a satisfactory fit, as shown by the 
high overall goodness of fit measures of GFI and CFI and a RMSEA statistics of .037, 
indicating a close fit. 
 
To test equivalence of the model across all countries. we conducted a multi-sample 
procedure. Regarding the model with equivalence in model form we were confronted with 
some estimation problems. Separate analysis of each country showed that these were 
caused by Heywood cases in two countries. In Greece, the estimated measurement error 
variance of d36 was negative, as was the error variance of d37 in Denmark. When these 
two error variances were fixed at a value of .05 in the respective countries, there were no 
longer any estimation problems in the separate analyses of each country. In order to 
prevent estimation problems in a multi-sample analysis, however, we also had to fix the 
covariances between measurement errors associated with these two items (d36 in Greece 
and d37 in Denmark). In Greece, the covariances between the measurement errors of d36 
and d37 and between d34 and d36 were set to zero. Likewise, in Denmark, we set the 
measurement error covariances between d35 and d37 and between d36 and d37 to zero. 
Consequently, the degrees of freedom of this model increased with 6, as is displayed in 
Table A4.3.3. The fit of this model was rather high, with an overall CFI of .998 and a 
RMSEA value of .035, indicating a close fit.  
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Finally, we tested the invariance of factor loadings across countries. Since we encountered 
no Heywood cases in this analysis, no adjustments for Greece or Denmark had to be made. 
The fit of this more restrictive model was still quite satisfactory. The overall CFI was .986 
and the RSMEA value of .048 indicated a close fit. Hence, we can conclude that 
dimensions of ‘favour ethnic distance’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ can be 
equivalently measured by the same indicators across all countries. The unstandardised 
factor loadings of this model are presented below Table A.3.3.  
 
Table A4.3.3 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 
’favour ethnic distance’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ 
Subsequent models RMSEA χ2 df GFI CFI Problem 
identification:
Problem solved 
by: 
Overall analysis: 
Europe-wide 
       
Model C1:  (d34 to d37) and 
(d25 to d30) 
.091 7440.45 34 .8989 .9134  
Model C2: including error  
 covariances for indicators   
 of ethnic distance 1) 
.050 2018.07 30 .9726 .9858  
Model C3: also including   
 error covariances for  
 indicators of perceived 
 economic threat 2) 
.043 1374.95 27 .9810 .9904  
Model C4: also including  
 error covariances for  
 indicators of perceived  
 non-economic threat 3) 
.037 878.23 24 .9875 .9936  
    
Multi-sample models    
Form equivalence    
Model C4   456 Not estimable 
due to two 
Heywoord 
cases in GR 
and DK 
Fixation of these 
two error 
variances and 
accompanying 
error covariances  
Model C4 with Adjustments 
in GR and DK 4)  
.035 1262.79 462 5) .9980  
Invariant factor loadings    
Model C4 6) .048 2557.19 600 7) .9857  
Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS2002/2003 
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1) Error terms for indicators of ethnic distance that refer to the same reference group (respectively 
‘same race/ethnic group’ or ‘different race/ethnic group’) or that refer to the same social domain 
(respectively ‘ your boss’ or ‘a close relative of you’) are correlated. Hence, error covariances for the 
following sets of items were estimated: items d34 and d35; d36 and d37; d34 and d36; d35 and d37. 
2) Explorative factor analysis indicates a one-dimensional factor structure for the 6 indicators of 
perceived threat. To account for the fact that the content of items d25, d26, and d27 to economic 
forms of threat, the error terms for these items were interrelated. 
3) The other three indicators of perceived threat (d28, d29, and d30) items refer to non-economic 
forms of perceived threat. To account for the similarity in item content, the error terms for these items 
were also interrelated. 
4) In Greece, the error variance of d36 was set to .05. The error covariances between d36 and d37, as 
well as between d34 and d36 were set to zero in Greece to derive a model that could be estimated in 
multisample analysis. Likewise, in Denmark the error variance of d37 was set to .05. The error 
covariances associated with this item (error covariance between d35 and d37 and between d36 and 
d37) were set to zero in Denmark. 
5) GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to .97 of higher for each sample, with the 
exception of Denmark and Luxembourg (.95). 
6) In the multisample model with invariant factor loadings, no adjustments for Greece and Denmark 
were necessary. 
7) GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to .97 of higher for each sample, with the 
exception of Luxembourg (.94), and Austria, Italy, and the Eastern part of Germany (.96).
European Social Survey 2002-2003 77 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d35
d36
d25
d379
d27 
d26 
favour ethnic distance 
perceived collective 
ethnic threat
1.23 
1.05
1.00 
1.18 
1.02 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
d34 1.00 
d28 
d29 
d30
δ 
δ 
δ 
δ 
1.35 
1.42 
1.11 
1.23 
Model 3 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities 
‘favour ethnic distance’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ 
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3.4 Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism 
 
The previous analyses were conducted among respondents without missing answers. 
Having assessed that these 20 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement 
for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we used this result to estimate missing 
answers of respondents. A missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to 
ethnic exclusionism was replaced by a regression estimate based on the answers that this 
respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. However, this 
procedure was only followed if a respondent answered more than half of the items referring 
to ethnic exclusionism. Respondents with less valid answers were excluded from all 
analyses.  
 
After substitution of missing values, we computed summated indices for each dimension of 
ethnic exclusionism. The indices are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Throughout this report, 
these indices are applied to measure exclusionist stances. The mean score on these indices 
across all countries and per country are displayed in Appendix 6. Table A4.3.4. displays the 
overall relationships between the indices of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. 
 
The strongest relationship exists between ‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘perceived 
collective ethnic threat’. The more people perceive ethnic minorities as a threat, the 
stronger they resists to immigration of non-nationals to their country. Moreover, all 
exclusionist stances correlate strongest with this measurement of perceived collective 
ethnic threat. All other correlations are positive too (as expected) and quite similar in their 
strength. 
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Table A4.3.4. Relationships between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism  
 A B C D E F 
Resistance to 
immigrants (A) 1.00      
Resistance to asylum 
seekers (B) .38 1.00     
Resistance to 
diversity (C) .38 .25 1.00    
Favour ethnic 
distance (D) .38 .29 .33 1.00   
Favour repatri-ation 
policies for criminal 
migrants (E) 
.38 .31 .33 .31 1.00  
Perceived collective 
ethnic threat (F) .55 .44 .44 .43 .41 1.00 
Note: EU-average. National samples were given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size: all 
countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, whereas Luxembourg was given a standard 
sample size of 875. 
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Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables  
at the individual level 
 
To measure the first of our independent variables, educational attainment, we used 
information on the highest educational level of the respondent. For this measurement of 
education, the ISCED 1977 coding scheme has been used. This country-specific 
measurement, which distinguishes seven educational categories, has been used in the 
descriptive analyses and ranges from ‘not completed primary education’ to ‘second stage of 
tertiary’. In the multilevel analyses we made use of an interval measurement of attained 
education in years, due to empty cells of the ISCED measurement in some countries. In 
order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of 
survey, we took their study length at the time of the interview. Furthermore, to prevent 
extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded 20 years of 
education as an upper-limit. 
 
With regard to social class we distinguished between people presently employed and non-
employed people. For those respondents currently employed, we recoded the available 
occupational classification codes into the nominal class typology of Erikson, Goldthorpe 
and Portocarero (1979). In the European Social Survey the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) of the International Labour Office of the United 
Nations was applied. To derive the EGP categories from ISCO88, we followed the 
procedures of and standard modules generated by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) 
and Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). In order to construct more appropriate EGP 
categories, the occupational classification is enhanced by additional information on 
employment status and supervisory status. We used information that indicated whether 
respondents were self-employed or not and whether they supervised others at work. For the 
self-employed, the number of employees was taken into account. For respondents who 
supervised others at work, the number of employees under supervision was taken into 
account. Some of the constructed categories turned out to be rather small. These small 
categories (with less than 4% of respondents) were added to one of the other categories. 
We distinguished higher professionals, lower professionals and routine non-manual 
workers. Self-employed people with or without employees as well as farmers were 
subsumed into one single category of self-employed people. Manual supervisors and 
skilled manual workers were taken together as a separate category. The final occupational 
social class category was that of the unskilled manual workers, to which farm labourers 
were added. To these occupational categories we added distinct categories of people who 
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were momentarily not active in the labour force: students; unemployed people; retired 
people, sick or disabled people; people working in their own household and looking after 
their children; and lastly, a rest category that could not be categorised (among which 
people in military service). 
 
In the ESS dataset, monthly net-household income was measured with a standard number 
of categories with standard ranges. Only for Ireland and Hungary country specific coding 
schemes were used. The ESS documentation provided information on how to make the 
country-specific coding congruent with the standard coding. To compare incomes between 
countries, for each country separately the mean income was set to one. Missing values for 
household income were – for each country separately – imputed by an estimated value 
based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing 
income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on four variables 
that are related to household income.6 
 
Urbanisation was measured by means of five categories: ‘farm home or countryside’, 
‘country village’, ‘town or small city’, ‘suburbs or outskirts of big city’ and ‘a big city’, as 
judged by the respondent. We used information on religious attendance, which we 
categorised into ‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘once a month’ and ‘frequently’, which is more than once 
a month. Political self-placement was measured by asking respondents to place their own 
political viewpoints on an eleven point scale, ranging from left (score 0) to right (score 10). 
Finally, we included gender and age as variables in the analysis. 
 
In the multilevel analyses we also included intermediate characteristics. For the 
measurement of perceived ethnic threat, we refer to appendix 2. Perceived unsafety was 
measured by one question whether respondents felt unsafe walking in the street after dark. 
This measurement runs on a four-points scale from ‘very safe’ to ‘very unsafe’. 
 
Social distrust was measured with three items, which with reliability analyses turned out to 
form a strong scale (Cronbach’s alpha= .77). The three items ‘you can’t be too careful 
versus most people can be trusted’, ‘most people try to take advantage of you versus most 
people try to be fair’ and ‘most people look out for themselves versus most people try to be 
helpful’ were recoded so that a high score means distrust in other people and a low score 
means low social distrust. Then, we took the mean score of the three items, on which one 
missing value was allowed. 
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Political distrust was measured with four items (‘politicians in general care what people 
like respondent think’; ‘politicians are interested in votes rather than in peoples’ opinions’; 
‘trust in country’s parliament’; and ‘trust in politicians’). The items were transformed into 
items with similar scale lengths, running from 0 to 10, at which 10 means ‘no trust’. After 
factor analyses showed the single dimensionality and reliability analyses provided 
satisfactory statistics (Cronbach’s alpha = .76), we computed one scale of political distrust, 
by taking the mean of the scores on the four items. Respondents were allowed to have one 
missing value. A high score of zero means no political distrust, whereas a score of 10 
means much political distrust. Only 25% of the respondents scored lower than the score of 
5 and showed political trust.  
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Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables  
at the contextual level 
 
Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this report 
we focus on the impact of the national context on individual attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities and immigrants. In order to explain cross-national differences in ethnic 
exclusionism, we searched for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of 
national contextual characteristics. However, one should be cautious when comparing 
national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-
national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. 
Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics 
between countries. In order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data 
are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as Eurostat, the 
United Nations Population Division and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of 
effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve 
consistency and comparability of indicators across countries. 
 
In the ESS dataset 18 countries are included we analysed. During data collection, four of 
these countries were candidate countries of the European Union, becoming member in 
2004: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We analysed the German data 
separately for (former) West and East Germany, due to the large differences in political and 
economic developments that took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast 
differences in economic and demographic circumstances that still exist between East and 
West Germany today. Hence, East and West Germany are regarded as separate ‘national’ 
contexts. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum applications, 
are by definition only defined for Germany as a whole. 
 
The national statistical data for the countries included in the European Social Survey are 
displayed in table A4.5.1. Figures on the unemployment rate in 2002 were taken from 
Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total 
active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of 
the European Union Labour Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 
years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks 
following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during 
the previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months. 
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We applied the unemployment rate in 2002, since this is the latest available annual figure 
on the unemployment rate. 
 
We applied data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to 
derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate 
for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in 
unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches 
Bundesamt (2003a). 
 
Figures on Gross Domestic Product were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured 
per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 
100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. At the time we started the analyses, only 
these indexed figures were available for 2002. Next, these relative figures are multiplied 
with the actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat 2003c) to derive the actual 
GDP for each country. The German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West 
Germany by the GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2003b).  
 
As a measurement of the presence of ethnic minorities in a country, we took for the 
Western European countries the number of non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship as 
a percentage of the total population and accounted for the number of naturalisations in the 
last 15 years. The latest available figures from Eurostat (2003d) refer to January 1, 2000. In 
this measurement, non-nationals with a citizenship of Western industrialised countries are 
not taken into account. That is, non-nationals with a citizenship from one of the European 
Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the United States, 
Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are excluded from the total number of non-nationals. 
For Austria and Luxembourg, the figures refer to the percentage of non-EU nationals. We 
derived separate figures for former West and East Germany based on the figure for 
reunified Germany, as reported by Eurostat, and the ratio of the percentage of foreigners in 
former West and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). 
Similarly, separate figures for Great Britain and Northern Ireland were derived by adjusting 
the figure for the United Kingdom with the ratio of ethnic minority groups in the UK and 
the respective regions, as found in the UK Census of April 2001 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2003). As in some countries the number of naturalisations is much larger than in 
others – particularly in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands (Eurostat 2003d; OECD 
2004) – and most naturalisations are applied to non-western citizens (OECD 2004), we 
included these numbers of naturalisations in our measurement of non-nationals with a non-
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Western citizenship. For Greece, the statistics on the number of non-nationals provided by 
Eurostat from 1998 turned out to deviate strongly form the latest Greek Census data 
(2001). Therefore, we decided to take into account the latter statistics. The Greek Census 
results report the number of inhabitants by citizenship to which we added the number of 
naturalisations as reported by Eurostat (General Secretariat of National Statistical Services 
of Greece 2004; Eurostat 2003d). For Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, 
similar figures from Eurostat were not available. We used the percentage of foreign citizens 
as reported by OECD statistics for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (OECD 2004). 
For Slovenia we used migrant stock as reported by the UNDP (2000).  
 
From the United Nations Population Division (2002), we derived the average annual net 
migration in the period 1995 to 2000, per 1,000 capita. The average annual net migration 
is the net average annual number of migrants during the period, that is, the annual number 
of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and non-
citizens.  
 
Finally, we took the average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1,000 
capita as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum applications are 
quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, 
such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce 
comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national 
differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), 
as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general. 
The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly 
fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding 
the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute 
numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total 
population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).  
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Table A4.5.1 Contextual characteristics of countries in the ESS  
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Unemploy-
ment rate in 
2002 a 
 
 
GDP per 
capita in 
2002 
(Non-Western) 
non-nationals in 
percentage of 
population in 
2000 c 
 
Average annual 
net migration in 
1995-2000,per 
1,000 capita d 
Average annual 
number of asy-
lum applications 
in 2001 and 2, 
per 1,000 capita e 
Finland 9.1 24.79 1.7 0.8 0.49 
Sweden 4.9 24.50 7.7 1.0 3.18 
Denmark 4.5 27.48 4.9 j 2.7 1.73 
Great Britain 5.1 f 24.77 h 3.4 k 1.6 1.89 
Ireland 4.4 30.12 1.1 l 4.9 3.53 
Netherlands 2.7 27.05 6.6 2.1 1.60 
Belgium 7.3 25.97 6.2 1.3 2.28 
Luxembourg 2.8 45.46 12.0 j 9.4 1.95 
Germany West 6.5 g 26.50 i 8.5 m 2.8 1.09 
Germany East 15.2 g 16.45 i 3.6 m 1.1 1.09 
Austria 4.3 26.90 10.2 n 0.6 4.27 
Spain  11.3 20.23 1.5 0.9 0.20 
Portugal 5.1 16.49 1.3 1.3 0.02 
Italy 9.0 24.55 2.0 o 2.0 0.15 
Greece 10.0 15.82 6.7 p 3.3 0.53 
Poland 19.9 9.46 0.1 q -0.5 0.12 
Czech Republic 7.3 14.38 2.0 q 1.0 1.41 
Hungary 5.6 13.58 1.1 q -0.7 0.80 
Slovenia 6.0 17.71 2.6 q 0.5 2.22 
a Source: Eurostat (2003a). Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  
b Source: Eurostat (2003a). GDP per capita in purchasing power standards.  
c Non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship as percentage of total population on 
January 1, 2000. Only non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship are displayed: non-
nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free 
Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are 
not taken into account. Source: Eurostat (2003b). For Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovenia figures refer to percentages of foreign citizens: Source: for Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary: OECD (2004) and for Slovenia: United Nations Population 
Division (2002). 
d Source: United Nations Population Division (2002). 
e Source for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on 
January, 1, 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003b).  
f Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002). 
g Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003). 
h Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a). 
i Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). 
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j Data January 1, 1999 
k Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003). 
l Data April 1999 
m Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003). 
n Data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998 
o Data on naturalisation for 1995 to 1999 taken from OECD (2004) Trends in International 
Migration. 
p Data January 1, 2001, Greek census data; data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 
imputed by average of 1996 to 1998. 
q Data exclude number of naturalisations, which were not available in the Eurostat 
publications. OECD (2004) estimates of a shorter period show relatively small numbers for 
the respective countries. 
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Appendix 6: Grand means, means per country and 
percentages of support for exclusionist stances 
 
Table A4.6.1 Mean score and percentage support on ‘resistance to immigrants’ and 
‘resistance to asylum seekers’ per country.  
 Resistance to immigrants Resistance to asylum seekers  
Country Mean a % support b Mean c % support b N 
Finland .530 59.24 .344 15.10 1953
Sweden .299 14.64 .361 10.94 1920
Denmark .486 50.45 .387 19.02 1435
United Kingdom .523 51.04 .537 47.88 1988
Ireland .431 35.27 .440 28.44 1954
Netherlands .484 42.95 .480 36.47 2311
Belgium .486 44.16 .529 48.41 1789
Luxembourg .521 52.74 .353 15.14 1068
West Germany .442 37.80 .441 27.79 1709
East Germany .499 47.54 .498 39.78 1086
Austria .550 64.37 .404 25.15 2129
Spain  .474 50.24 .384 18.37 1606
Portugal .596 62.47 .425 23.89 1434
Italy .433 36.50 .441 27.93 1176
Greece .695 87.48 .446 31.13 2401
Poland .471 43.77 .386 16.72 2055
Czech Republic .514 49.76 .440 29.99 1321
Hungary .682 86.53 .538 47.47 1641
Slovenia .485 43.20 .481 34.70 1493
     
All countries d .505 50.47 .440 29.01 32469
All countries e .485 46.43 .449 30.23 32469
a Based on a four-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
d To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except 
Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all 
countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample 
size of 875. 
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e To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
 
Table A4.6.2 Mean score and percentage support on ‘resistance to diversity’ and ‘in 
favour of ethnic distance’ per country 
 Resistance to diversity Favour Ethnic distance  
Country Mean a % support b Mean c % support b N 
Finland .538 44.96 .291 18.43 1953 
Sweden .510 39.90 .185 9.06 1920 
Denmark .528 43.76 .263 17.35 1435 
United Kingdom .482 34.75 .296 18.86 1988 
Ireland .462 28.92 .298 19.37 1954 
Netherlands .472 30.80 .287 17.74 2311 
Belgium .525 41.98 .347 25.21 1789 
Luxembourg .495 33.03 .170 9.09 1068 
West Germany .512 39.56 .265 16.03 1709 
East Germany .528 42.10 .299 21.39 1086 
Austria .520 43.01 .194 11.42 2129 
Spain  .555 47.87 .264 16.45 1606 
Portugal .664 68.29 .264 18.24 1434 
Italy .566 48.14 .359 27.75 1176 
Greece .721 77.23 .437 39.33 2401 
Poland .645 67.64 .291 19.50 2055 
Czech Republic .618 61.81 .387 30.99 1321 
Hungary .542 45.64 .315 22.18 1641 
Slovenia .613 59.34 .350 26.99 1493 
      
All countries d .554 47.69 .296 20.59 32469 
All countries e .547 46.47 .299 20.47 32469 
a Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates a support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c Based on a eleven-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
d To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except 
Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all 
countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample 
size of 875. 
e To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
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Table A4.6.3 Mean score and percentage support on ‘favour repatriation policies for 
criminal migrants’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’ per country 
 Favour repatriation policies for 
criminal migrants 
Perceived collective ethnic 
threat 
 
Country Mean a % support b Mean c % support b N 
Finland .624 59.34 .495 41.83 1953 
Sweden .577 49.32 .452 32.81 1920 
Denmark .540 43.83 .518 49.97 1435 
United Kingdom .634 60.34 .570 61.19 1988 
Ireland .634 59.82 .539 54.36 1954 
Netherlands .662 65.47 .539 55.08 2311 
Belgium .656 63.44 .571 62.88 1789 
Luxembourg .558 46.28 .481 39.58 1068 
West Germany .715 75.19 .542 57.40 1709 
East Germany .770 83.88 .584 65.99 1086 
Austria .636 61.46 .525 52.03 2129 
Spain  .663 64.62 .524 51.96 1606 
Portugal .753 83.21 .564 61.54 1434 
Italy .780 79.88 .530 53.94 1176 
Greece .834 87.27 .706 84.73 2401 
Poland .730 78.08 .548 57.48 2055 
Czech Republic .833 86.74 .615 75.13 1321 
Hungary .867 91.90 .618 74.65 1641 
Slovenia .676 69.59 .568 63.36 1493 
      
All countries d .695 69.54 .554 58.17 32469 
All countries e .710 72.18 .552 58.18 32469 
a Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been 
dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates a support, and each value 
on or below the middle range value indicates a low score. 
c Based on a eleven-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.  
d To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except 
Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all 
countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample 
size of 875. 
e To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to 
their population size. 
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Notes appendices 
 
1 We applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a). GFI is a 
normed statistics ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI 
of 0.90 has been proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit 
measure that takes account of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested 
using Steiger’s Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the 
discrepancy (due to approximation) per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the 
model fits exactly. It will decrease if parameters are added to the model that substantially 
reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, however, the additional parameters reduce 
the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. Based on practical experience, 
Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model 
in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate a 
reasonable error of approximation. 
2 As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models 
represents a continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model 
form and similarity in parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form 
if each model has the same parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same 
location of fixed, free, and constrained parameters. The invariance in model form is a 
matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in model form can be rather low if 
models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed variables load on 
different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in model 
form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated 
measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the 
one extreme where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other 
extreme where all are invariant. 
3 Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – 
the model assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all 
factor loadings across countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of 
invariant factor loading ratios is justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of 
the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 1986). 
4 LISREL detected normality violations in the correlation matrix for the resistance against 
immigrants items. This was solved by dichotomising these items in the LISREL analyses 
(‘allow none’ and ‘a few’ in a category and ‘allow some’ and ‘many’ in a category). 
5 In some instances, the programme may provide a negative variance estimate for the 
measurement error of a particular item. This situation is called a Heywood case (Boomsma 
& Hoogland, 2001). This anomaly can be solved by setting the specific error variance to a 
fixed value, for instance zero. Since fixation of error variances to zero would imply 
absence of measurement error, we prefer to set negative error variances to a value of .05 
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6 Based on the available information in the ESS dataset, the following variables were 
applied in the regression analysis of household income: ‘years of fulltime education’, ‘age’ 
(divided into six categories); ‘social class of the respondent’, ‘marital status’ (with 
categories (i) living with partner, (ii) married, but not living with partner (iii) 
divorced/separated (iv) widowed (v) not living with a partner, previously cohabited with a 
partner and (vi) never lived with a partner), ‘having children’, and ‘subjective perception of 
household income’. A random normal deviate was added to this estimated income value to 
prevent a drop in the standard deviation of the income variable. Finally, the range of the 
imputed income values was set equal to the original range of the income variable. 
 
